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The Aggrey-Fraser-Guggisberg Memorial Lectures, established by 
the University of Ghana twenty-one years ago with financial assistance 
from the Government of Ghana, have attracted some of the world's 
leading scholars who have come from far and near to help commem­
orate the great contributions of three personalities — Aggrey, 
Fraser and Guggisberg — whose vision and conception of higher 
education in Ghana led to the founding of Achimota College and laid 
the solid foundations, both physical and intellectual, on which the 
premier University of this country, the University of Ghana, was 
built. Dr J. E. Kwegyir Aggrey was the First Assistant Vice-Principal 
of Achimota College; Rev. A .G . Fraser was the First Principal; 
and Sir Gordon Guggisberg was then the Governor of  the Gold 
Coast (now Ghana). Professor Ralf D ahrendorf— academic, author, 
politician, administrator and a distinguished European — brought 
much distinction to these lectures.
Bom on 1st May, 1929, in Hamburg of a social democratic politician 
father, Gustav Dahrendorf, Professor Dahrendorf  grew up in 
Hamburg, Berlin and Buckov.
He studied Philosophy and Classics at the University of Hamburg 
between 1947-1952 and undertook his post-graduate studies in 
Sociology at the London School of Economics from 1952-1954. He 
taught Sociology at the University of Saar in Saarbriicken, where he 
was Assistant from 1954 and Privatdozent from 1957. Between 1957 
and 1958, he was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the 
Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, Palo Alto, U.S.A. He was Professor 
of Sociology at Hamburg University in 1958, Tubingen in 1960, and 
Constance University in 1966. He was the first Dean of the Faculty 
of Social Science at the University of Constance from 1966-1967. 
He has been visiting Professor at several European and North 
American universities.
Professor Dahrendorf is not only an academic; he has been actively 
involved in the educational development of his country. From 
1964-1968, he was Adviser on educational matters to the Land 
Government of Baden-Wiirttemberg. He was Vice-Chairman of 
the founding committee of the University of Constance (1964-1966) 
and Chairman of the Commission on Comprehensive University 
Planning (1967-1968). From 1966 to 1968, he was a member of  the 
German Council on Education.
Professor D ahrendorf has led an exciting political life. In 1967, he 
became a member of the Free Democratic Party (FD P). For six 
years, between 1968 and 1974, he was a member of the Federal Ex­
ecutive of the FDP. He became a member of the Land Diet of Baden- 
Wurttemberg and Vice-Chairman of the FDP parliamentary party 
(1968-1969). He was a member of the Federal Parliament 
(Bundestag) and Parliamentary Secretary of State in the Foreign 
Office (1969-1970) under the coalition government of Brandt and 
Scheele. Indeed, he comes from a family with a history of a high 
level of political consciousness and activity. His father, Gustav 
Dahrendorf, was one of the leaders of the Socialist Democratic Party 
of what is now the Democratic Republic of Germany. He had to 
cross the border to West Germany when differences arose between 
him and some of his colleagues about the future of the Socialist Party.
Between 1970 and 1974, he served as member of the Commission 
of the European Communities in several areas. He was responsible 
for external relations and foreign trade from July 1970 until 1973. 
and for research, science and education until October 1974.
Professor Dahrendorf is a member of several international societies. 
He was President of the Germ an Sociological Society (1967-1970), 
Chairman of the Royal University of Malta Commission (1972-1974), 
member o f  the German PEN-Centre since 1971. He has been member 
of  the H onorary  Praesidium of the Anglo-German Society since 
1973.
In 1966, he was the Director of European Centre for Research and 
Documentation in the Social Sciences. In 1975, he was Senator of 
the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft. He is a trustee of the Ford Foundation 
and Chairman of the Social Science Council of the European Science 
Foundation.
Professor Dahrendorf  was appointed Director of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science in October 1974 for 10 
years. The very length of the tenure of his appointment is enough 
testimony to his reputation then as administrator and academic, 
especially when it is remembered that he was appointed at a time 
when the L.S.E. was engulfed in student unrest. His appointment 
is also a reflection of his reputation as a European. To many people, 
it was inconceivable that a German could have been appointed, at 
that time. Director of the L.S.E., an institution with a liberal and left- 
wing reputation.
Several universities have honoured him, and I would like to 
mention only a few: D. Litt. from the University of Reading; LL.D. 
from the University of Ulster; Honorary Fellow of the London 
School of Economics; Fellow, Imperial College of Science and 
Technology, London; Honorary Master, Royal Irish Academy,
Dublin; Foreign Honorary Member, American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences; and Fellow of St. Anthony’s College, Oxford.
Professor Dahrendorf is a prolific writer. In 1953, he wrote “ Marx 
in Perspective” . His “ Industrie-and-Betriebssoziologie” which he 
wrote in 1956 has been translated into Italian, Spanish, Dutch, 
Japanese and Chinese. In 1959 he wrote “ Homo S o c io lo g ie s '  which 
has also been translated into English, Italian, Portuguese and Finnish. 
He wrote “ Klassen und Klassenkonflikt” in 1957 which was also 
translated into English as “ Class and Class Conflict in 1959. In 
1963, he published “ Society and Democracy in G erm any” . Other 
publications are: “ Die angewandte Aufklarung” 1963, “ Pfade aus 
Utopia” , 1967 and in 1971 “ Essays in the Theory of Society” . In 
1973, he published “ Pladoyer fur die Europaischie U nion” . “ The 
New Liberty” was published in 1975. He was appointed Reith 
Lecturer in 1974 and given the Journal Fund Award for Learned 
Publications in 1966.
He was appointed Reith Lecturer in 1974 and given the Journal 
Fund Award for Learned Publications in 1966.
Several nations have recognized his immense contribution to the 
advancement of knowledge and humanity, and have fittingly conferred 
on him meritorious national decorations: G rand Croix de l'ordre 
du Merite du Senegal, 1971; Grand Croix de l 'ordre du Merite du 
Luxemborg, 1974; Grosses Bundesverdienstkreux Mit Stern und 
Schulterband (Germany), 1974; Grosses goldenes Ehrenzeichen 
am Bande (Austria), 1975; Grand Croix de l 'ordre de Leopold II 
(Belgium), 1975.
The theme Professor Dahrendorf chose for his lectures is “ A New 
World Order? Problems and Prospects of International Relations in 
the 1980s” . He spoke on five topics: (i) The Old World Order Under 
Strain; (ii) Social Change and International Relations; (iii) Europe: 
A Model? (iv) From Unbalanced Development to International Class 
Struggle? and (v) Elements of a New World Order.
The printed version of those stimulating lectures will be a useful 
companion to all students of International Relations and to the 
general reader.
The University wishes to acknowledge its sincere gratitude to the 
Government of Ghana for its continued support of these lectures and 
to the Pioneer Tobacco Company, which in recent times, has taken 
on a substantial portion of the financial support.
D. A. B e k o e  
VICE-CHANCELLOR
M A R C H , 1978
PREFACE
It is one thing to write about the future of international relations in 
a cosy study in England, and a very different one to try and persuade 
an African audience of one’s conclusions. Others have described 
the mixture of pleasure and awe which the Aggrey-Fraser-Guggisberg 
lecturer experiences as he addresses, in the Great Hall of the University 
at Legon, an unusually responsive, interested and friendly audience. 
I was deeply moved by the occasion. But for a lecturer concerned 
with tomorrow 's world order, it was a test as well: unless his analysis 
and projections stand up to the critical judgment of citizens of poor 
countries, they are not likely to be of much importance. Whether I 
have succeeded or not, is not for me to say. But it would be difficult 
to find a better place for the test than Ghana with its remarkable 
tradition of sophistication and humanity.
In one respect I confess to misgivings. These lectures leave many 
questions open. Their overall title is a question, as are those of two 
of the five lectures. Indeed, they end with a question which leaves 
the somewhat gloomy comment that precedes it suspended in mid-air: 
‘Mankind usually solves its problems when it is a little too late to 
solve them sensibly. Why should this be any different with respect 
to the problems of international relations in the 1980s?’ This is not 
meant to be defeatist; on the contrary. Honest analysis is in my 
view a necessary prerequisite of effective action. There is much that 
can be done today towards the objectives of peace, prosperity and 
citizenship rights for all. I want to encourage rather than discourage 
those who are involved in the long and slow process of changing a 
reality that is seriously wanting in many respects.
What I have called honest analysis means thinking through what is 
and what might be. Even if the right decisions are taken too late, 
when they are more costly than they need be, someone has to invent 
and design the patterns which can then be followed. Is this a task of 
scholarship? I have some sympathy with a rigorous concept of 
scientific inquiry which rules out the overly general as well as the 
openly normative. But scholarship or not, someone has to try and 
shake people out of their complacency, make sense of  the reality 
of international relations today, and provide some material which 
may be useful if and when people look round for solutions.
It remains for me to thank my hosts, and notably the Vice- 
Chancellor of the University of Ghana, Dr Bekoe, and his able staff, 
for their limitless hospitality and kindness, and of course for the 
invitation which gave me a chance to collect my thoughts on a new 
world order.
R a l f  D a h r e n d o r f
L O N D O N , OCTOBER,  1978
LEC TU R E I
THE OLD WORLD ORDER  
UNDER STRAIN
The world order devised by the allies of the Second World War 
was ingenious, benign and short-lived. In fact, it could be 
argued that it never lived at all, because by the time Stalin 
had come round to accepting the notion of the United Nations, 
his motives and Roosevelt’s dreams of One World were far 
apart. Within a year of the conference of San Francisco, it 
became clear that there would not be one world order, but 
two, or rather, that the order of the world would depend on 
the explosive relationship between two hostile systems. More 
than once, this relationship led the world to the brink o f  a 
general war; and a series of regional wars in Asia, the Middle 
East, the Mediterranean and Africa were fraught with the 
risk of turning into the great holocaust of the Third World 
War. In the end, it was probably the balance of terror that 
prevented the two superpowers from going over the brink. 
Somehow, the world began to settle down to living with the 
division between communist and liberal claims to superiority. 
With detente , there appeared even the first shaky bridges across 
the divide. Yet I shall argue that what has happened since 
the beginning o f  the 1970s is not so much an incipient solution 
o f  old problems as the emergence of new themes and issues. 
Suddenly, there are at least two features which put the old 
world order o f  a precarious balance of power under strain: 
one, the discovery that the two sides are themselves not as 
homogenous as they might have presented themselves to the 
outside, that is, evidence of what has come to be called 
polycentrism in the place o f  a bipolar system; then more 
important still, the emergence of a new and urgent theme of 
international relations around development and the inequality 
of men in world society.
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This is, in a few sentences, the story which 1 want to tell in 
my first lecture. It provides the setting tor an analysis o f  the 
issues, forces and institutions of international relations in the
1980s, but it is in itself a story worth pursuing.
The story of the old world order begins during the Second 
World War, and in the United States of America. The extent 
to which Americans devoted their time and energy to thinking 
about the future when the present demanded so much of  their 
attention is a testimony to the peculiar quality embodied by 
American society: enlightenment applied is the formula which 
I would use to describe it . 1 There were to be sure theorists and 
practitioners of the post-war order, or, as they came to be 
called, “ legalists” and “ realists” . The legalists included the 
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, the Inter- 
American Juridical Committee, and the Universities Committee 
on Post-War International Problems. Their reports, o f  which 
the first appeared in 1941, laid much of the groundwork for 
State Department thinking on the political side o f  post-war 
world organization, that is, the United Nations. On the 
economic side, the British contribution was notable, although 
Harry Dexter White thought John Maynard Keynes far too
idealistic and introduced an element of realism even at the
planning stage.
The realists were the protagonists of allied politics at the 
time. As early as 1943, Roosevelt described to Stalin in Teheran 
the main features of the projected United Nations. The notion 
of four powers — sometimes called “ four policemen” — as 
guarantors of the new order emerged, and Stalin must have 
seen that this provided Russia with unprecedented opportunities 
of power, especially in view of the fact that two of the four 
powers, Chiang Kai-shek’s China and Britain, were hardly 
serious competitors.2 Churchill, not surprisingly, added his 
own points, notably about Europe, and about the special 
relationship between Britain and the United States. Meanwhile, 
American financial experts, often against the advice o f  their 
British friends, tried to adjust proposals for international
1 I have used this formula in the title or my (Germ an) book on “ Society and 
Sociology in America": Die angewandte Aufklarung (M unich 1963).
France, later to be the filth permanent member o f  the Security Council, was 
o f  course not part o f these designs and decisions.
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monetary and trade arrangements so as to leave the door open 
for the Soviet Union. Gradually, a consistent picture emerged: 
a political world organization open to all nations, designed to 
guarantee peace and provide a framework for the solution 
o f  all problems, and upheld by the joint responsibility o f  the 
four powers and policemen; a series of economic organizations 
under this political umbrella, designed to bring about monetary 
stability, a climate o f  expanding trade and guaranteed access 
to certain basic commodities.
Then, in 1944-45, most o f  the conferences took place which 
were supposed to promulgate the design. The conference 
convened in San Francisco in 1945 in order to set up the United 
Nations Organization had a considerable history, including the 
summit communique o f  Yalta and the preliminary meeting at 
Dum barton  Oaks in 1944. At San Francisco, the organizational 
decisions were taken, including the Veto and article 51 about 
“ collective self-defence” . A little after San Franscisco, 
economic experts assembled again in Bretton W oods and agreed 
on the rules and institutions of the world monetary system. 
The International Monetary Fund (IM F) and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) were 
created as a consequence. Two years later, when the mood 
was already beginning to change a conference about trade was 
convened in Havana. The result disappointed the legalists, 
for neither an International Trade Organization nor a Com ­
modity Corporation was set up; but the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (G A T T) which emerged served at least 
some of their purposes.
It is easy to point to the limitations of these institutions, es­
pecially after they have run into difficulties more than twenty- 
five years later. It is all the more important therefore not to 
forget the achievement which they represent. The set o f  rules 
and institutions promulgated in 1945 and soon after has given 
peace, prosperity, independence and incipient economic 
development to many, and some minimal certainty to almost 
all. Even as an object o f  criticism and attack, it has reminded 
m ost people and all governments of the need to develop world­
w ide  rules of  political and economic conduct. “ By comparison 
to the  thinking o f  the planners of 1919, by comparison also to 
the  practice of the League of Nations ... the internationaliza- 
lon  o f  political and economic thinking has been strengthened.
in 1944-45, to an extent which is plainly fundamental .” 3 
This is the cautious judgment of Max Hagemann, a Swiss 
international lawyer who begins his analysis of what he calls 
“ the provisional peace” with a list of the three main problems 
of order facing the peacemakers of 1945: Who can assume 
responsibility for the new order? Which guiding principle 
should become its backbone? How can this principle be given 
territorial and organizational shape?
The answer given to these questions at the time was imprecise, 
shaky and unenduring; it was in any case more than one answer, 
although we shall see that in all three respects the United States 
o f  America played a very special part. But first, let us return 
to history. The United Nations Organization was set up with 
all four “ policemen” participating from the outset. This was 
not the case, however, with the economic organizations de­
signed to back up the political edifice. Early in 1946, it became 
clear that the Soviet Union had no intention o f  joining the 
International Monetary Fund, or the preparations for a trade 
organization for that m atter .4 Some American officials, notably 
at the Treasury, were surprised and concerned as they informed 
the American Charge d ’Affaires in Moscow of these develop­
ments. His name was George Kennan, and he in turn was 
upset about the naivete of his government, or some o f  its 
departments, and proceeded to respond by what has come to 
be called “ the long telegram” in which he analysed Russia’s 
motives and intentions: “ Russians will participate officially in 
international organizations where they see the opportunity of 
extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting the power 
of others. Moscow sees in U N O  not the mechanism for a 
permanent and stable world society founded on mutual 
interests and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims 
just mentioned can be favourably pursued. As long as U N O  
is considered here to serve this purpose, the Soviets will remain 
with it. But if at any time they come to the conclusion that 
it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power 
expansion and if they see better prospects for pursuit of these
3 Quotation from M. Hagemann: Der provisorische Frieden (Zurich 1964), 
p. 220. This is a thoughtful and impressive study o f  the post-war order, 
its genesis and legal and political meaning.
4 Although Poland and Czechoslovakia joined the G A T T  in 1947.
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aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon 
U N O .” 5 As it happened, the Russians did not abandon the 
United Nations which first became an institution close to 
American interests, then a forum of contest between the super­
powers, and later, at times, an effective instrument o f  Soviet 
policy, so that it was the Americans who considered aban­
doning it .6 But the Soviet Union never joined the institutions 
of economic cooperation which would have been a source of 
constant embarrassment for them; a part o f  the new world 
order became an order for a part of the world only. And on 
a deeper level, K ennan’s long telegram marks the beginning 
of a reversal o f  American foreign policy from embrace o f  the 
Soviet Union to containment. By the same token it marks 
the beginning of the two worlds which have dominated the 
quarter-century following the Second World War.
The story of international relations after 1946 has often 
been told. It began with containment, soon led to the Cold 
War, much later to precarious co-existence and around 1970 to 
detente. In institutional terms, it involved the creation o f  two 
separate, and often explicitly hostile sets o f  organizations and 
rules. When N A TO  was created in 1949, Senator Vandenberg 
and others claimed that it was “ within the charter [of the UN], 
but without the veto” . 7 It would have been even harder to 
argue that it was also in keeping with the spirit o f  One World. 
Not unnaturally, the Warsaw Pact followed suit. On the 
economic side, and in addition to the theoretically universal 
institutions IM F  and GATT, the developed democracies o f  the 
West established first the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC, 1948), and in 1961, with larger membership 
and new objectives, the OECD. The communist countries of 
Eastern Europe and Asia as well as in later years Iraq and 
Cuba responded by setting up the Council for M utual Economic 
Assistance (Comecon or CM EA ) in 1949. There remained, to 
be sure, a num ber o f  universal organizations in technical areas, 
such as the Universal Postal Union or the World Meteorological 
Organization, but wherever politically sensitive subjects were
5 G. Kennan: M em oirs 1925-1950  (London 1967), p .552.
6 In one case, the ILO, this consideration turned into action in 1977.
Cf. M. Hagemann: op. cit., p.316.
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touched, separate and opposing institutions were created in 
the 1950s.
Rather than describe this process in detail, or look at the 
crisis points from Korea to Cuba, I want to identify three main 
characteristics of the world order which emerged from the 
partition o f  the One World of which some had dreamt in 1945; 
for it is these characteristics which lead us to the sources of 
strain on the rules and institutions of the bipolar world.
The first is the totality o f  the division. One feature o f  the 
world order that prevailed from 1946 to the late 1960s is that 
it tended to draw all other countries and issues into the process 
of polarization around the increasingly advanced nuclear super­
powers USA and USSR. The two worlds which emerged were 
clearly dominated by their respective superpowers, and those 
who did not belong to either had little choice but to opt for 
one or the other when pressed to do so.
This is, to be sure, an overstatement, or rather, a static 
statement of what was in fact a process. There were, first of  all, 
the other original permanent members of the Security Council, 
though their power was severely curtailed by domestic changes. 
China was in turmoil when the United Nations was set up. Four 
years later, M ao Tse-tung had established his supremacy over 
the entire country. The years that followed were years of 
internal stabilization, accompanied by an external position 
which tended to support the Soviet Union. Britain, on the other 
hand, was rapidly declining as a world power. The independence 
o f  India in 1946 marked the beginning of the end o f  the Empire. 
Internal economic difficulties left the country behind when the 
great take-off began between 1946 and 1948. The “ special 
relationship” turned from a political reality into a sentimental 
memory. In military terms, the M acM ahon agreement con­
firmed both Britain’s independent access to nuclear weapons 
and the limits of this independence as prescribed by the United 
States.
There were non-aligned nations of course, jealous o f  their 
independence from superpower domination, outside the 
military pacts, and from time to time organizing themselves 
as in the Asian-African Conference of Bandung in 1955, or 
in the meetings arranged by Tito, Nasser and others. There is 
no question that the position of these countries deserves respect; 
but equally, it is clear that non-alignment was, more often
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than not, based on an existence in the long shadow of the 
interests o f  the superpowers. In any case, their independence 
was not total in many cases. There were those who wished to 
enjoy the advantages of Western economic cooperation 
without incurring the wrath of the East; there were those who 
belonged, to all intents and purposes, to one or the other camp 
without formal membership; some of the non-aligned could 
shift their position at the slightest provocation, or rather, 
assistance from one side or the other. At no time was the non- 
aligned movement likely to introduce a genuine third factor 
into the power field of the two superpowers.
It is strange but true that tfris bipolar world reached its 
climax at a time when the leaders of the two camps were much 
less belligerent than some of their predecessors. President 
Kennedy was probably quite favourably inclined to a certain 
amount of decentralization in the Western camp, and First 
Secretary Khrushchev probably did not want war with the 
United States. But it was in the 1960s that the dominance of 
the superpowers was most visibly asserted — from the Berlin 
Wall in 1961 to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 in the 
East, with the beginning o f  the Vietnam war on the Western 
side, and the Cuba crisis as the climax of tension in the relation­
ship of the two. One needs but mention these events to recognize 
the seeds of discontent and change in the divided world.
The second characteristic of the bipolar world order is 
that its main theme was strategic, territorial and political; there 
was a strong military bias in it, so that NA TO and the Warsaw 
Pact became the dominant international institutions. There 
was, and is, o f  course an underlying social, economic and 
political theme in the conflict between East and West. This is 
a conflict about two ways of  getting rich, one based on incentive, 
competition, freedom of choice and the enormous growth 
potential o f  market economies and liberal democracies; the 
other based on force, planning, administered restrictions of 
choice and the limited growth potential of planned economies 
in the totalitarian democracies of one-party rule. However, the 
very fact that this socio-economic and political difference was 
one o f  two separate paths to the same destination rather than 
one of redistributing scarce resources and products, may have 
contributed to accentuating the traditional power-political 
character of the struggle.
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This then was the character of the international conflict 
between the two superpowers: Both sides firmly believed that 
their system was superior to the other, and that it would 
prevail. Letting history take its course (as one side believed), 
or' letting people have their choice (as the other thought), more 
and more countries would follow their cues.
While such expansion was desirable, the first need was to 
stabilize one’s own camp and contain the other; there was a 
defensive element in both alliances. But defence was mixed 
with hope for advances and sometimes concrete steps to this 
end. Iran, Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Angola 
are so many examples for one side or the other trying to wrest 
control from its opponent or at any rate hoping that he would 
lose it. Throughout, the conflict was about defending or 
extending territorial control with political or military means.
It is a part of this picture that all attempts to regulate the 
conflict — since the late 1960s characterized by the term detente 
— were confined to military-political instruments. The central 
feature of Germany’s treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland 
and the German Democratic Republic was the recognition of 
the territorial status quo. The most important overall nego­
tiations are the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and 
the talks about Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (M BFR) 
since the early 1970s. If one looks at the Helsinki agreement of 
1975 at the end of the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE), it is soon apparent that the economic 
“ Basket Two” is nearly empty, that “ Basket Three” is about 
the fundamental ideological differences and has exposed the 
weakness of the Soviet position on human rights, whereas 
“ Basket One” , the “ confidence-building measures” , summa­
rizes the theme of the bipolar world order.
There is a third aspect of this world order which needs 
emphasis, although I suspect that my point here will meet with 
more surprise than the others. If  one looks at the story of 
international relations since the war, one cannot but be struck 
by how thoroughly they were dominated by the United States. 
If there is any one theme of the old world order, it is that it was 
after all a pax Americana. 8 The very name United Nations
8 It is relevant in this context to refer to R. A ron’s works, for exam ple, Paix  
et Guerre entre les nations (Paris 1962), where this point is made on the very 
first page.
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was conceived in analogy to the United States. While the 
economic institutions o f  the new order, IM F and G A TT above 
all, turned out to be institutions of one half o f  the world only, 
there can be no question that this half has set the tone o f  the 
world economic climate, and more. In fact, the Soviet Union 
has never been able to build a viable, self-sustained economic 
system; it has become a satellite of the dollar-system. Not only 
has the economy of  the G A TT-IM F countries been immensely 
more successful than that of the Comecon; the dollar has be­
come a universally acknowledged mode of expressing economic 
facts and indeed facilitating transactions: it, and not the ruble, 
is used as the convertible currency of Eastern Europe; GATT 
rules determine trade across the boundaries of systems as well 
as within. What some American officials were seeking to 
achieve in 1944-45 by compromise and agreement, has in fact 
occurred by success and by domination.
The pax Americana was not confined to economic affairs. 
Throughout the period in question, the United States had 
remained superior in military terms. Throughout, it has 
remained a model even for the Soviet Union itself, let alone for 
its dependents; Krushchev admitted as much when he promised 
that he would “ catch up with America” within a decade. There 
is a sense in which the answer to the questions posed by Max 
Hagemann was: that responsibility for the post-war order was 
taken by the United States, that its guiding principles were 
economic growth based on market principles and the domina­
tion of developed liberal democracies, and that it was given 
organizational shape more in the economic organizations than 
in the U N .9
But here I must stop this descriptive account. The point of 
my story is that all this has to be stated in the past tense. If 
there was a pax Americana, it is no longer with us, nor is the 
bipolar world which I have described.
There are some obvious changes. China, from being a 
country in turmoil and then a Soviet ally, has become a self- 
confident international force in its own right, and one that is 
not allied with either of the superpowers. Japan, while small 
in area and even population, has emerged as the second largest
l> M. H agem ann’s own answer is, to be sure, more cautious. Cf. op. cit.,
p.633 sqq.
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economic power of the world. In Europe, processes of 
integration have made some progress; from time to time, the 
member states o f  the European Community speak with one 
voice. It is this kind o f  development which has led Henry 
Kissinger to modify the bipolar picture o f  world politics into 
one which is pentagonal, with Washington, Moscow, Brussels, 
Peking and Tokyo in the five corners . 10
But this notion of  Kissinger’s was misleading, in more ways 
than one, as Alastair Buchan was the first to point o u t . 1 1 For 
one thing, the five corners represent rather uneven powers in 
terms o f  cohesion, degree of mobilization, and basis o f  strength. 
Europe exists from time to time, Japan is as absent from the 
military scene as Russia is from the economic scene, China 
is as much promise and claim as reality. On closer observation, 
the United States emerges as the only universal power rather 
than one instrument in a concert that might be compared to the 
19th-century games between Prussia, Austria, Russia, France 
and England. Yet the important point is that the United States 
is no longer in this position today. The world has changed, 
and the old world order has begun to give way since the early 
1970s. Two dates stand out in this development, and while 
both have their pre-history and their consequences, I want to 
use them to illustrate the point that the old world order is no 
longer intact: 15 August 1971 and 6 October 1973.
On 15 August 1971, President Nixon announced a series of 
economic measures which had implications far beyond their 
immediate objectives. He suspended the convertibility o f  the 
dollar into gold indefinitely, and imposed a temporary surtax 
o f  10 per cent on all dutiable imports into the United States. 
Even in technical terms, these were extraordinary measures. 
The surtax meant a reversal o f  one of the guiding principles 
of the post-war order embodied in the trade liberalization 
negotiations of what was after all called the Kennedy Round. 
The monetary measures cut even deeper. While this had 
not been laid down at Bretton Woods when the pound sterling 
was still a lead currency for some, the fact was that the dollar
10 There is some discussion as to where and when Kissinger first said this, and 
how strongly he believed it. Cf. however, President N ix o n ’s statements 
reported in Time, 3 Jan. 1972.
11 Cf. A. Buchan: “ A World Restored?” , in Foreign Affairs (July 1972).
TH E  O LD  W O R LD  O R D E R  U N D E R  STR A IN
had become the world’s reserve currency. It was assumed that 
the United States would keep the parity of the dollar stable 
whatever happened to other currencies, and would be prepared 
to pay for the consequences of this responsibility. President 
Nixon was not willing to do so, nor his outspoken Secretary of 
the Treasury, Connally. “The United States,” said Connally 
at a press conference on 16 August 1971, “ has the same right 
as any other nation to put her own interest first.” That was the 
end of the pax Americana.
There is, to be sure, a pre-history of these events which shows 
that they were not quite as unexpected as their Japanese name 
“ Nixon shocks” suggests; and there is a follow-up which 
suggests that the appearances of the old world order were kept 
up, as they are to the present day . 12 For years, a debate had 
been raging between America and its partners about respon­
sibility for the deficits in America’s balance of payments. In 
Europe, and presumably in Japan, there was (to quote Andrew 
Shonfield) “ a feeling that the Americans were trying to have it 
all ways — fighting an exceptionally expensive colonial-type war 
in Vietnam, while imposing no restraint whatever on the up­
surge of demand in the American home market, and doing very 
little else that looked like being effective to halt the deterioration 
in their balance of payment” . 13 In America, on the other hand, 
the view was held that the balance o f  payments deficit o f  13 
billion was a direct and indirect result o f  America’s support 
for the world monetary system, and especially for currencies 
kept artificially low at the expense of the dollar. The abortive 
“ Mills Bill” of 1970 had been a warning, so far as trade is 
concerned, and — so it was argued— 15 August 1971 was an 
inescapable consequence o f  the intransigence of America’s 
partners.
Nor did the international economic system crumble over­
night, under the impact of the Nixon shocks. On the contrary, 
when I led the EEC delegation at the special meeting of  the 
contracting parties of GATT on 25 August 1971, I argued
' : When the dollar floated downwards in relation to most other currencies in 
1978, President Carter was told by his allies that he had a responsibility to 
support it as if 15 August 1971 had never happened.
A. Shonfield: “ International Econom ic Relations o f  the Western World: 
An Overall View” , in International Economic Relations 19 5 9 -1 9 7 1 (London
1974) p.56.
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the European case in terms of the agreed rules o f  free trade, 
and the American delegation did not question these rules for 
one moment. We were talking, if not acting, within a common 
framework. Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, and yet with a 
telling return to common values, the new trade round which 
we began to discuss at that time, was at first christened Nixon 
Round (although a few years later, the American government 
discreetly hinted that Tokyo Round might be a more adequate 
name). On the monetary side, similar attempts were made to 
use familiar rules and institutions. The Smithsonian Agreement 
of 19 December 1971 was described as a re-alignment, and 
celebrated by President Nixon as an historic achievement.
President Nixon was wrong. The historic achievement did 
not last a year; and the IM F  Group of Twenty and others are 
still looking for rules for a world o f  “dirty” floating and the 
games, political, speculative, and otherwise, that can be played 
in it. The agreement reached in the Tokyo Round to cut tariffs 
on industrial goods by another 33 per cent sounds pleasing, 
yet it is all but irrelevant; on problems of agricultural trade, 
raw materials and energy, trade between different economic 
systems, trade creation, and many non-tariffs barriers there is 
little progress. The international economic system is in a state 
of flux without apparent end or even direction.
Nor are we merely talking about the international economic 
system. 15 August 1971 marks a watershed in international 
relations generally. It signifies changes with respect to two of 
the three characteristics of the old world order, and by 
implication to the third as well. We begin to see signs o f  a 
world in which military questions recede in favour of economic 
questions, and one in which American domination, if it 
continues at all, becomes involuntary. By the same token, the 
stage is set for a transition from a bipolar world into one with 
very different structures.
The signs for a transition from the military-strategic to the 
economic theme of international relations are many, and the 
reasons are apparent In the 1950s and 1960s, leading statesmen 
concentrated at their meetings on political matters in relation 
to strategic and military questions; meanwhile, economic 
affairs were discussed by experts. In the 1970s, the reverse has 
happened. Even the NATO Council has taken to discussing 
the challenges to modern society and the future o f  the economy
as much as matters of military policy. The changing agenda 
reflects a growing concern. For many years, it was simply 
assumed that the socio-economic system which one wanted to 
defend would produce steady economic growth. Now, this 
growth has become precarious. Internal and international 
factors combine to make it necessary to devote more time to 
the conditions of economic growth and social welfare.
In communist countries this process is probably taking place 
somewhat more slowly. Given the nature of totalitarian 
political systems, concern with military matters is still much 
in the foreground. At the same time, these countries too are 
faced with the problems of satisfying rising expectations, and 
they find it increasingly difficult to do so. It may sound para­
doxical, but there are indications that after many years in which 
Soviet leaders hoped for, and promoted instability in the West, 
they have now begun to fear such instability, because the 
economic stability of the capitalist system is a condition of 
their own progress.
The retreat of the United States from explicit responsibility 
is only partly related to these developments. The traumatic 
experience of the Vietnam war has left scars in America as 
well as in Asia. But it is clear in any case that in a world 
dominated by economic politics, American superiority is one 
of degree rather than of kind. The G N P  of the United States 
is only three times that of  her nearest competitors, and per 
capita it is lower than that of some others. Per capita income 
too is higher in a number of European countries than in 
America. Japan ’s and Germany’s volume of trade is very 
similar to that o f  the United States. Since 1970 it has become 
clear that to some extent at least other currencies can play the 
part previously played by the dollar. To be sure, the combi­
nation of economic strength and military power, coupled with 
territorial invulnerability and the recent history o f  predom­
inance still make the United States the strongest single factor 
in world politics. But the country has become a reluctant 
power, strong by the default of the others, and notably Europe, 
as much as by design, and concerned with its internal problems 
more than with those of others . 14
14 I have argued this case more elaborately in “ International Power: A
European Perspective” , Foreign Affairs (October, 1977).
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I said that this sets the stage for a change in the bipolar 
system. Before I pursue this line of thought, let me make one 
point quite clear. I am arguing that a theme and a pattern 
which have determined international relations for a quarter of 
a century are in retreat. The military-political conflict between 
East and West is no longer the dominant feature o f  the world 
scene. But of course, it is still with us, and for those immediately 
affected by it because they are living at the boundary o f  the 
two worlds it is very much with us, indeed. One might even 
argue that for some, there is more danger now that the attention 
o f  the world is no longer focused on them. In any case, yester­
day’s world is an element of today’s and tom orrow’s even if 
it no longer colours them entirely.
But — to return to the thread of my argument — the new 
theme is increasingly apparent. This is where the second date 
mentioned has its significance. October 6, 1973 was the day of 
the Jewish holiday Yom Kippur, the beginning o f  the Yom 
Kippur war and the accompanying rise in oil prices which made 
the OPEC countries emerge as a power in the world. The 
consequences o f  these events are many and by no means related 
to one theme only. In the developed world alone, at least two 
deserve mention. The oil crisis of 1973 has accentuated the 
new awareness o f  the importance of economic policy as an 
international concern. The lasting memory of  the picture of 
streets empty o f  cars because of petrol rationing has reminded 
many of  the possible limits of growth. There are many other 
effects, of course, not the least of which concerns changes in 
the financial systems of the world.
But the main point I want to make in connection with the 
Yom Kippur war is another one. It is the first example in 
modern history of countries which were hitherto regarded as 
dependent and weak using their muscle effectively against the 
apparently powerful. This muscle is there because o f  the 
dependence of the rich on resources over which they no longer 
have immediate control. The example may in one sense be 
irrelevant. It is quite conceivable that the OPEC countries see 
themselves not as opponents of the rich in an international 
class struggle, but as candidates for the club o f  the rich. M ore­
over, the problem of resources by no means creates a clear 
dependence of the developed on the developing w orld ; South 
Africa, the Soviet Union and Canada are more important in
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this respect than all developing countries outside OPEC 
together. Yet, however limited its economic relevance, the 
example is important politically, because it shows that with all 
their wealth and power the rich can find themselves in trouble.
Like 15 August, 6 October 1973 cannot be seen in isolation. 
A whole series o f  events in the early 1970s has given the issues 
o f  development a new urgency. U N C TA D  activities were 
stimulated greatly by the Delhi Conference of 1968. All United 
Nations agencies had in fact begun to devote much of  their 
energy to questions of development by 1973. Since then there 
have been world conferences on population and food. Members 
of the Group of 77 made their mark in G A T T ; and demanded 
more participation in the I M F : the issue o f  special drawing 
rights indicates a trend. The World Bank has in any case 
become an institution for developing countries. While much 
that is said on occasions like the Special Assembly o f  the United 
Nations has little lasting substance, there is no question that 
the theme of development has arrived on the international 
agenda. As the subject o f  international relations shifts from 
the military to the economic, questions o f  privilege and depri­
vation take the place o f  a competition of different paths to 
wealth.
To this issue, and to many others mentioned in this rapid 
and concentrated survey, I shall return in the following lectures. 
At this stage, I want to make one point only. The post-war 
order has turned out to be determined by two worlds and their 
organized conflict. In so far as there were winners or losers at all 
in this conflict, it seems clear that the United States dominated 
the scene. Since the early 1970s however, this scene has 
changed, imperceptibly at first and more and more visibly 
since. The old conflict entered a period in which conciliation 
was sought, and new institutions — CSCE, SALT, M BFR 
were created ad hoc, that is, outside the UN system for the 
purpose. At the same time, a series of events combined to 
push the East-West theme into the background. Increasingly, 
international relations came to be dominated by economic 
issues. With them, a third world emerged to some power; the 
p ro b le m  of rich and poor countries began to take the place of 
th a t  of communist and liberal ones. This process is obviously 
co n t in u in g .  I have deliberately not spoken o f  a breakdown of 
the old order, but o f  it being under strain. Yesterday’s conflicts
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are still with us, and so are the institutions on which the older 
order was based. Yet if we try to answer Max Hagem ann’s 
questions o f  order a last time, a picture o f  amorphous fluidity 
emerges.
Who can assume the responsibility for the world order today? 
The United States is still the most powerful country in the 
world, yet its power is limited by its failures, its competitors, 
and its own unwillingness to use it. The Soviet Union is 
certainly still an important power, but hampered by its economic 
weakness and internal instability. It might be argued that 
there is — there would be — a place for Europe, that is, for a 
confederation o f  powers which is not a superpower. I shall 
argue this case, but it will emerge that there are few signs of 
Europe living up to its destiny. The G roup o f  77, or OPEC, 
are hardly in a position to assume responsibility, if only because 
their internal divisions are clearly more marked than their 
common interests. If one were to begin to set up a new world 
order from scratch, it would be difficult to find the “ four police­
men” who look after its rules, and it is little consolation that 
the last lot have not done too well in the job.
What guiding principle should become the backbone o f  the 
world order today? When he raised the question, Hagemann 
had in mind such principles as balance of powers, or collective 
security. In fact, we have seen that the guiding principle o f  the 
old world order was very much an American syndrome of 
economic prosperity by free trade and market economies in 
liberal democracies as the dominant set of values. Today, it 
appears that this set o f  values is no longer either dominant or 
beyond doubt even in its country of origin. To be sure, there 
is if anything a revival of interest in human rights, that is, in 
the essential inviolability o f  m an’s life and dignity. But on 
economic and political structures there are as many questions 
as there are answers. And if we turn our attention to the new 
theme of  international economic relations, development, only 
the most ideological liberals would defend the market as a 
sufficient condition of progress. Today, there is great 
uncertainty about guiding principles. What we will explore in 
these lectures is whether there is a set of rules which might serve 
the interests of all in a world of economic struggles and uncer­
tainties. It may well be that this is the vantage point from 
which the other questions can be answered.
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How does the principle find concrete organizational 
expression? We have seen that the United Nations has in fact 
never acquired the relevance which it was supposed to have. 
This is not to say that it was, or is, useless; there are many 
international problems for which it is important, not the least 
o f  which is the permanent reminder of the need for truly inter­
national institutions. We have also seen that the economic 
institutions of the post-war era are under severe strain and have 
not yet found an effective function for the future. As we look 
around, we find the world littered with ruins o f  international 
institutions, all the more agreeable for highly paid civil servants 
as they retreat into invisibility. But as new problems emerge, 
new institutions are created ad hoc, and without systematic 
connection. I have mentioned the CSCE and other instruments 
for dealing with the old conflict between East and West. The 
new conflict between North and South is discussed in m any  
places, but it is no accident that a special North-South Dialogue 
has been invented for the purpose. Many issues of economic 
policy are nowadays discussed in regular Summits o f  the main 
industrial nations. It is quite clear that we have entered a phase 
of institutional exploration. It is equally clear that for the time 
being this means confusion and anomie.
LEC TU R E II
SOCIAL CHANGE AND  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The study of international relations shares with the conduct of 
foreign policy a dilemma which may be called the double trap 
of  legitimacy. On the one hand, there is the temptation to 
regard nations as figures on the chess board of world politics. 
They are first given their place, then moved about in various 
patterns, removing each other, establishing superiorities or 
suffering defeats, and all that in accordance with certain alleged 
laws of motion o f  these entities. In practice, this was o f  course 
the approach o f  some o f  the great statesmen o f  the 19th century, 
and at least one statesman of  our own time —  an admirer of 
Castlereagh, Metternich and Bismarck — has tried to apply 
their attitude to the world today. But as we have seen, Henry 
Kissinger’s pentagonal world not only overlooks the many who 
do not readily fit into the Washington-Brussels-Moscow- 
Peking-Tokyo relationship and is thus unprepared for events 
like the Cyprus war; it also overestimates the ability of the five 
centres to direct those in their orbit, for which deficiency Europe 
is but one example. Above all, the trap of power politics 
consists in the almost inevitable danger o f  losing internal 
legitimacy. Foreign ministers may in one sense represent 
their countries in their entirety, rather than just one faction or 
party, but this very fact makes them run the risk o f  no longer 
representing anything. The actors of international affairs are 
complex living societies which have to sustain the actions of 
their representatives and will not be played with at will.
There is, however, the other trap, that is, populism turned 
international. A foreign policy which is looking for domestic 
support at every step is not only likely to be ineffective and 
extremely slow, but it is also likely to be highly parochial. 
Foreign policy involves elaborate means-ends-relationships
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which are not easily explained to the electorate, especially at a 
time when few voters are prepared to listen to those endless 
speeches on Turkey or Persia to which Gladstone treated them 
nearly a century ago. People want protectionism, but free 
trade is demonstrably better for them in most circumstances; 
people in the developed world want to protect their privileges, 
but neglecting the demands of the developing world works 
demonstrably against their longer-term interests — there are 
only too many examples of  people’s inclination to short-circuit 
international problems. We are treading on treacherous ground 
here, to be sure, for it is always dubious to argue that people are 
unaware o f  their “ real” interests and have a “ false” conscious­
ness. Indeed, the terms which both scholars and politicians 
like to use to reveal “ reality” — raison d 'etat, or national 
interest — have as often been abused as they have been inter­
preted to embody what I would call demonstrable though 
indirect interests.
Thus it is difficult to escape the double trap o f  legitimacy. 
But perhaps it makes sense to try and look at the underlying 
social developments in the world in their own right, before we 
try to relate them to issues of foreign policy. The purpose of 
this exercise is to identify some of the main forces at work in 
what is not yet, but may well become one day a world society.
The theme which I want to pursue to that end is that of 
modernity — familiar enough, indeed perhaps too familiar, 
for if there is one force which has moved all modern societies, 
and all modern social scientists as well, it is the great trans­
formation from status to contract, solidarite mechanique to 
solidarite organique, Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft.1 Its features 
are numerous and have been given many names. M ax Weber 
traced the origin of the desire of some to accumulate means of 
production, and the readiness of most to accept the discipline 
of organization, to a certain kind of  ethic, protestant in the 
sense of being geared to the individual and to human rationality, 
to deliberateness, purposiveness, calculation. Adam  Smith and 
the political economists in his succession down to Karl Marx 
and beyond emphasized the underlying forces o f  production,
1 References are, o f  course, to the books by H .F . M aine ( Ancient Law),
E. Durkheim  (D e la division du travail socia l), and F. Tonnies ( Gemeinschaft
und Gesellschaft).
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the division of labour, technical progress, the economies of 
scale as motors of economic growth. Tocqueville's anger, 
M arx’s irony and Mill’s enthusiasm all concerned the same 
corollary o f  such development, variously described as democ­
racy, equality, citizenship. After the Industrial and the French 
Revolutions all men were assumed to be equal in some respects, 
and thus as some suspected, in the end in all (although originally 
all men were literally only men, not women, and their equality 
was little more than a legal fiction). Historians were the first 
to realize that modernization meant an enormous process of 
uprooting people, o f  geographical migration, social mobility 
and political mobilization. These then are some o f  the motive 
forces of societies which we call modern: cultural values of 
individualism and rationality, an economic organisation 
centred on quantitative growth, a strain towards equality 
in the social system, and a polity based on the mobilization of 
all for good or bad .2
The qualification is important, for there are in fact several 
modernities. I have mentioned two when I discussed the 
East-West conflict as one between two ways o f  getting rich. 
There is the rationality o f  the market and that o f  the plan; 
economic growth based on incentive and on force; equality 
based on equal citizenship and equal impotence; political 
mobilization based on democratic participation and totalitar­
ian organization. These are simplified models. In fact, the 
world has seen almost as many paths to modernity as there are 
societies. When Germany began to follow the English model, 
the result was a specific and explosive mixture o f  national 
culture and modern forces. Japan’s unique blend of  elements 
has often been described. There is no one model o f  modernity, 
and an analysis in general terms is not meant to suggest that 
all who come later have to follow those before them. But there 
are contradictions which few can escape who embark on the 
process of modernization. Their peculiar flavour varies from 
society to society (depending, e.g., on the degree of violence, 
the role of law and the experience of conflict regulation in 
their traditions), but their basic features are the same, and 
they probably have something to do with the way in which
2 The literature on the subject is enorm ous. One good summary (in German) 
is P. Flora: Modernisierungsforschung (Opladen 1974).
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countries conduct their foreign policy and take part in the 
process of international relations. I want to spend much of 
my time in this lecture on the analysis of the contradictions 
o f  modernity in Western societies and their effect on the world 
order, but perhaps two other points, in some ways simpler, 
though themselves worthy o f  more detailed study, may help 
to explain the figure o f  thought by which I am guided.
First, a word about the contradictions o f  modernization. I 
have mentioned Germany as an example. When industrial­
ization and the accompanying social processes hit the country 
in the 1870s, German society was in many ways unprepared .3 
To be sure, there had been pockets of modern social and 
economic development for some decades; moreover, German 
intellectuals had been very much a part o f  the liberal movement 
from the French Revolution through 1848 to the formation of 
liberal parties. But when Marx published the first volume of 
his Capital in 1867, it was no accident that his data were taken 
almost exclusively from the British experience. Not only had 
authoritarian governments forced him out of his country, but 
German society and its economy would have provided more 
examples o f  persistent feudal structures and the effectiveness 
o f  tradition than of capitalism and its conflicts. The values, 
patterns and institutions o f  German society were military- 
bureaucratic, or rural-traditional, and traces o f  the new world 
appeared but in the interstices of old structures.
Modernization descended on this society like a snowstorm on 
Egypt. By 1914, Germany was transformed. The growth 
rates of its economy, and in several critical branches o f  industry 
real output, had overtaken those o f  Britain. Its cities had 
grown, millions o f  people had moved to the industrial centres, 
there were trade unions and a powerful Social Democratic 
Party and all the social and political signs o f  a flourishing 
modern community. Yet this was only part o f  the truth. In a 
strange way, older traditions had been maintained or adapted.
' he Junkers o f  Prussia had done as well as the barons of the 
R uhr; these in turn, if they were upstarts in the first place, 
dreamt o f  nothing more passionately than o f  being appointed 
Leutnant der Reserve, lieutenant in the reserves; a democratic
An extensive analysis o f the point made here can be found in my book Society
and Dem ocracy in Germany (London-N ew  York 1967).
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constitution camouflaged continuous authoritarian govern­
ment; and when the war began, the allegedly internationalist 
Social Democrats rallied to the flag and voted the war credits 
along with all other groups.
This is something of a caricature of a story that has often 
been told. But its importance is greater than may appear at 
first sight. In some ways the latecomers to industrialization and 
modernity have all followed the German example more nearly 
than that o f  Britain. What happened is that pre-modern, 
pre-industrial structures were not transformed by a gradual and 
autonomous process o f  change, but that instead new structures 
were superimposed on them suddenly and often from outside, 
both literally and figuratively. In some cases, the traditional 
patterns caved in and gave way to modern ones; in others, 
modern patterns remained but a surface veneer; throughout, 
the most curious faultings of old and new evolved, a highly 
explosive arrangement of  social geology, for which the success­
ful industrialist craving the title of lieutenant — a modest rank, 
but recognized by a world of traditional status — is a most 
telling example. It has been argued that it was these explosive 
faultings which gave rise to the apparently irrational and 
certainly unpredictable turns of German politics. They made 
it possible for William II to mobilize Germany’s newly gained 
industrial strength in 1914 for a rather traditional war, pre­
modern in its motives, if not its techniques. They made it 
possible for a Weimar Republic to emerge from this war which 
had all the trimmings of  a liberal, modern society. They made 
it possible for Hitler to gain power with a programme appealing 
to pre-modern dreams and primeval resentments, and a policy 
as modern as the idea o f  totalitarianism which he first put into 
words. The same faultings, though mitigated by the involuntary 
modernization o f  National Socialism, made it possible for two 
Germanies to emerge from one after 1945 — one totalitarian 
with a new colour, the other liberal and democratic.
You will appreciate that I am talking about my own country, 
to which I feel that strange mixture o f  love and despair which 
has robbed so many Germans o f  their sleep since Heinrich 
Heine first found words for this ambivalence .4 But I suspect
4 “ Denk ich an Deutschland in der Nacht, dann bin ich um den Schlaf geb-
racht,” said Heine.
that the point which I am trying to make is much more general. 
It certainly applies to Japan, and may well have something to 
do with the domestic worries and international uncertainties 
surrounding so much o f  the developing world. Modernization 
produces erratic results, and often caricatures o f  the great 
men and moments of history. Traditional dictators and 
traditional gentlemen, pocket Napoleons and pocket Washing­
tons look equally out o f  place in a world o f  jet planes and 
computers; but there they are. Their only predictable policy is 
that of preserving and strengthening national identity. For that 
they may go to war, or accept international rules and even 
courts, but the nation they need, these tyrants and gentlemen. 
Beyond it, or rather, within its boundaries, things are unpre­
dictable and liable to change quickly and deeply. The faultings 
o f  rapid modernization produce instabilities which are likely 
to be with us for many years to come.
There is another set o f  contradictions associated with 
modernity in one o f  its variants which we must consider briefly. 
It has to do with modernization Russian-style, that is, with 
economic growth by force and political mobilization by 
deliberate organization. I do not want to engage in the largely 
spurious discussion about whether Marx, when he developed 
his theories o f  the eventual victory of communism, had 
countries like Russia in mind or not. In historical fact, he did 
not, though that hardly matters. But there may be a case for 
applying a version o f  M arx’s theory of class and class conflict 
to societies which undergo the process o f  modernization by 
totalitarian means.
One o f  the fundamental contradictions o f  society — so Marx 
argued — arises from the fact that forces of production outgrow 
relations o f  production. Let me generalize the point. Con­
tradictions arise from the fact that a society is organized in 
such a way that it fails to give people what it might give them. 
A lth o u g h  it would be possible for everyone to have a m otor­
car, somehow this does not happen; 12 per cent o f  G N P  is spent 
on defence instead. Although it would be possible for most 
to spend the summer on the beaches o f  the Black or the Caspian 
Sea, o r  somewhere else where it is pleasant, this does not 
happen, b u t  holidays are rationed and often given to work­
people without their families and friends. More than that, 
there are th o se  who are in fact in possession of most of  the
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privileges which their society can offer — politicians, adminis­
trators, a few engineers and scientists, and the like — but they 
carefully guard the rules and patterns which restrict these 
privileges to them.
This is in fact the next step in a Marxian analysis: forces 
and relations o f  production are represented by social classes. 
There is the class o f  the possessors, the ruling class, which 
either has, or can hope to have what its society can offer. In 
Soviet society this is not too dissimilar from the Party itself. 
Then there is the class o f  the dispossessed, the subjected class 
of  those who would like to have more, and could in theory 
have it, but are prevented from getting it by the ruling class. 
In the Soviet Union, the suppressed are o f  course not allowed 
to organize, although increasingly there are signs o f  their 
existence. Many thousands are in camps and mental hospitals 
even today; recently there has been an abortive attempt to 
found an unofficial trade union, dissidents speak for the dis­
possessed and it is more and more difficult to silence them. 
Thus, a genuine class conflict arises. Where does it lead?
Again, this analysis is greatly compressed and simplified. 
Leaving Marx, however, and applying elements o f  a more 
general theory o f  revolution, one is bound to infer that in 
societies in which modernization is based on force, the potential 
o f  revolutionary change is high. Given the slightest hope — 
the spark that ignites a revolutionary situation — the fabric 
o f  these societies will explode, as it did in Hungary in 1956 and 
in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Such societies survive by a pre­
carious balance of force and protest; they are constitutionally 
unstable, even if they revert to turning the screw o f  public 
force tighter; an element o f  unpredictability is a central feature 
of their political habitus.
Mentioning Hungary and Czechoslovakia is an indication 
of  the foreign-policy consequences of this condition. It should 
be added that more recently, in connection with detente and 
the CSCE, there have been some signs of attempts to accom­
modate dissidence and even expectations o f  participation to 
some exten t; though as soon as such changes produced threats 
to the power o f  the Party, leaders have tended to go into reverse 
gear. A foreign policy informed by fear o f  domestic instability 
is likely to be aggressive or  introspective in an incalculable 
mixture and sequence. It will look for support for its status
quo wherever it can find it. It will resist international arrange­
ments which encourage uncontrolled forces, free trade, 
convertibility, the movement o f  people and information. It 
will prefer the chessboard politics o f  power, because it has got 
the instruments of force to put down protest, but lacks the 
instruments o f  liberty to accept participation. But it may 
well be mistaken.
I am aware that as I proceed I am painting a picture in which 
the brighter colours are almost entirely missing; and I am 
afraid that this will continue to be the case as I move to the 
strange story o f  modernization Western-style. This is, in the 
first instance a success story. In the 25 years following the 
Second World War, the countries of  what may be called the 
O ECD  world have made unprecedented progress in almost 
every aspect of their social structure. Between 1948 and 1973, 
the G N P  of the United States trebled; and disposable personal 
income more than doubled in real terms. For some European 
countries, the figures are even more spectacular . 5 Every index 
o f  consumption naturally shows massive increases. At the 
same time, working hours were reduced and holidays in­
creased. Social services were extended to all. Suffrage was 
extended to all adults over 18. An educational explosion took 
place which eventually gave about one-third of all young 
people the chance of a tertiary education. In terms o f  quantity 
there is only one major index which has shown decline, and 
that is the birth rate.
Here is a real case for taking up the thread o f  class analysis 
where Marx left it. He believed that capitalism would of 
necessity lead to ever more intensive class struggles. The 
capitalist class would accumulate more and more riches, 
whereas the working class would be progressively impoverished, 
until its organizations would blow up the existing mode of 
production in the name of  new and unsatisfied forces o f  pro­
duction. There is much in this theory that makes sense, but 
there are also consequential mistakes. One o f  these is the 
unquestioned assumption that a mode o f  production cannot 
change, that ruling classes will defend their privilege without
Aggregate data o f  this kind are dubious; however, follow ing W. Rostow
{The W orld Economy, London 1978), one may assume that growth in what
he calls “ North-W est Europe” was more than 50 per cent higher than in the
United States.
SO CIAL CH A N G E  A N D  IN T E R N A T IO N A L  R ELA TIO N S 2 5
26 L E C T U R E  II
being prepared to adjust. We have seen that there are such 
classes; contemporary communist societies provide a striking 
example. But it is a characteristic o f  most of the OECD 
countries , 6 and notably o f  the United States o f  America, 
that they proved capable of  adjusting their social structures 
time and again without falling apart. The class struggle was 
won without war. In fact, it is one o f  the characteristics of 
these societies that they proved capable o f  change without 
revolution.
When Werner Sombart wrote his little book on the question 
Why is There No Socialism in the United S ta tes? in 1906 he 
gave a remarkable answer . 7 People in America found it 
possible, he said, to satisfy their growing wants and expectations 
by individual mobility. I f  they were unhappy, they did not 
join a trade union or a socialist party, but changed their jobs, 
perhaps their places o f  residence. There is a general point in 
this explanation. Open societies offer individuals opportunities 
even without collective action, at any rate without violent 
collective action. They give way, as it were, to demands for 
change without crumbling. There is a sense in which political 
democracy is an arrangement to make such change without 
upheaval possible. Elections and multi-party systems limit the 
time scale of power and open the door to new ideas and 
interests. The rigidity that produces revolution is absent from 
their very structure. Almost all OECD  countries have been 
democracies in this sense throughout most of the period in 
question.
The class struggle channeled into regulated democratic 
conflict has thus made possible both economic growth and 
social policies which have increased individual welfare and 
citizenship rights for all. Times o f  such growth are times of 
confidence, perhaps over-confidence. It may have been the 
experience of  precariousness in the inter-war period which led 
the advanced democracies after the Second World W ar to 
protect their opportunities as well as develop them. Given 
this development, and the seemingly endless chance to play
6 This definition is used here and throughout for the “ Club o f  the R ich” . The 
24 members o f  O ECD define it well, although the organization also includes 
some marginal cases, such as Turkey and Yugoslavia.
W. Sombart: Why Is There No Socialism in the United S tates?  (London  
1976)
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positive-sum games, it would seem plausible that the United 
States and its allies never had any reason to consider attacking 
those who followed another path to growth with more limited 
success. At the same time, there was a considerable interest 
in maintaining conditions favourable to further growth, free 
trade, convertibility and the expansion o f  markets. With 
respect to the other world, not yet known as the Third, the 
position was more complex. Desired as markets, though not 
as competitors, needed as suppliers of  raw materials, though 
not at market prices, they found themselves under cross­
pressures which on balance did not help them enough ; and 
if they turned to the other side for help, these pressures could 
take on very tangible forms.
In any case, it is not my intention to paint an idyllic picture 
of the O ECD  world. The trends which I have indicated have 
in fact produced their own contradictions; and today, after 
1971 and 1973, contradictions begin to dominate the scene. 
They are as yet barely understood by social analysts, let alone 
by the statesmen o f  the First World, though there is an increas­
ing literature with titles that would have sounded surprising, if 
not absurd a decade ago: Limits to Growth, Small is Beautiful, 
The Cultural Contradictions o f  Capitalism, W hat’s Wrong With 
the Modern W orld?8 What indeed? Let me leave the cultural 
aspect — what has long been called the dialectics of enlighten­
ment9— on one side and turn to three problems which illustrate 
the contradictions of modernity above all, The Economic 
Growth Debate, The Social Limits to Growth, and The Crisis 
o f  Democracy (and these are of course titles of recent books as 
well10).
Economic growth in the Western world has today run into 
a series of difficulties. Some of these may be externally 
generated, like the rise in oil prices, but most are closely related 
to the values underlying growth itself; they are intrinsic con­
tradictions o f  the process on which modern economies are
8 The authors are (in this sequence): Club o f  Rom e (N ew  York 1972); F.
Schumacher (L ondon 1972); D. Bell (N ew  York 1976); M. Shanks (London
1978).
This is the title o f  a book by M. Horkheimer and Th. W. A dorno: D ialektik
der Aufklarung (Am sterdam  1947).
1 he authors are: E. M ishan (London 1977); F. Hirsch (L ondon 1977);
M. Crozier et al. (N ew  York 1975).
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based. One o f  these, dramatically exposed by the Club of 
Rome, has to do with the consequences of  the thoughtless 
exploitation o f  resources. Much criticism has been levelled 
against the Cassandra calls o f  the Club o f  Rome, but two 
facts remain valid. One is that resources, so far as we know, 
are not unlimited and are therefore bound to become more 
expensive. The other is that resource exploitation and 
especially energy use has side-offects on the environment 
which we cannot sustain forever. Then there are socio­
economic contradictions. From a certain point onwards, 
further economic growth means further investment in technical 
processes which increase productivity. These same processes 
also lead to the abolition of jobs, to redundancy which not only 
produces unemployment but also reduces the demand which is 
needed to sustain growth. The same vicious circle occurs as a 
result of social policy. Through pressure and deliberate intent, 
the real wage in many occupations, especially in the service 
sector, is pushed up to higher and higher levels. This desirable 
development means that local communities and organizations 
can no longer afford the people they would need to provide 
certain services. As a result, the number o f  jobs decreases, 
while the quality o f  services deteriorates. Such factors cannot 
fail to have an effect on people’s attitudes. No longer is growth 
the one and only objective; people begin to worry about what 
they have got and feel that preserving and protecting it is 
good enough.
Such attitudes are strengthened by analogous developments 
with respect to that basic equality of all men which is so much 
a part o f  modern societies. Following T.FI. Marshall, I like 
to describe the process as one of the extension o f  citizenship 
rights. 11 They begin as strictly legal rights, a promise of 
equality before the law. This soon turns out to be insufficient. 
It needs to be backed up by giving people a part in the process 
of making laws; universal suffrage is introduced to provide 
political equality. But this too is a fairly abstract promise. 
What does universal suffrage means in a society of flagrant 
social and economic inequalities? Thus the process o f  equaliza­
tion begins to be extended to social rights, the right to a 
minimum wage, the right to protection in sickness and old age,
11 Cf. T. H. M arshall: Citizenship and Social C lass (Cam bridge 1950).
the right to an education, perhaps the right to work. Many 
o f  these rights are in the first place described as leading to 
equality o f  opportunity. But equality is a voracious beast, 
and opportunity  a temptable maiden. The educational debate 
has shown the problem most clearly. Equality o f  opportunity 
certainly means that there must be no legal or financial barriers 
restricting access for able people. But this is not enough. The 
opportunities o f  the working class child are restricted also by 
cultural factors given with his or her family of origin. So these 
must be changed. But there are limits of such change, and 
with them one soon approaches the limits of  equality, perhaps 
o f  citizenship. They are of several kinds. Either it is regarded 
as necessary (to continue the educational example) to change 
school requirements in such a way that children from dis­
advantaged backgrounds are actually represented proportion­
ately at all levels, for example, by admitting dialects instead of 
“educated '’ language; in this case the very opportunities which 
are supposed to be given, learning an “educated” language, 
disappear. There are many examples of the process of equali­
zation destroying the very benefits which it is supposed to 
give, examples of crowding; the ten-millionth car is obviously 
worth less in satisfaction than the hundredth. Or else the strain 
towards equality meets with even more solid barriers, that is, 
features which are intrinsically incapable o f  equalization, 
what Fred Hirsch called “ positional goods” , such as being 
president of the country, or merely chief engineer of a company, 
or local councillor . 12 In both cases, the result is widespread 
frustration, and also the desire on the part o f  the haves to 
protect what they have got, preferably without letting anybody 
else get the same.
The political consequences of such limitations are very 
serious. I have described democracy as a system which can 
accommodate change without upheaval. This means in most 
cases that change leads to improvement for all, possibly more 
for some than for others, but ultimately for all. Democracy is 
successful to the extent to which it can be played as a positive- 
sum game. This is how it is played of course, that is, as a com­
petition of promises and rising expectations which, while never
2 F. Hirsch (in his Social L im its to Growth) distinguishes between the “material
econom y” o f  goods which can be spread equally without detracting from
their value, such as food, and the “ positional econom y" for which this is
not true.
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totally satisfied, are never totally disappointed either. But if it 
is no longer possible to satisfy rising expectations, the demo­
cratic process becomes difficult. Britain has been through three 
years o f  falling real incomes by “ social contract” between 
1974 and 1977, but the country cannot take more o f  the same 
thing without risking widespread protests and violence. 
Governor Brown of  California may replace promises by 
charm for some time, but there comes the moment when he 
too has to deliver improvements. It is no accident that under 
such conditions the demand for a return to more authoritarian 
forms of government arises. Professor Huntington has advo­
cated this direction of development in the United States despite 
the experience of Nixon and Watergate. He says: “ We have 
come to recognize that there are potentially desirable limits to 
economic growth. There are also potentially desirable limits 
to the indefinite extension of political democracy .” 13 But 
others take the diametrically opposed view first expressed 
by A! Smith in the 1920s when he said that the only remedy 
for the ills of democracy was more democracy, and repeated 
more recently by Willy Brandt’s demand that “ we must dare 
more democracy” . 14
These two positions are in fact indicative of  the new political 
conflict emerging in the developed countries, which also 
provides the social background of  attitudes taken to inter­
national problems. Given the success o f  the assumptions of 
progressive modernization under market conditions and within 
democratic institutions, a large majority o f  people and their 
representatives are still gathered around this view. In fact, 
we must not overlook the fact that in some societies of the 
OE C D  world there are many people left who stand to benefit 
from such an approach. In one aspect, Euro-communism is 
an attempt to get by hook or by crook what could not be had 
by gradual and autonomous processes. Italy and France, as 
well as Spain and Greece, have by no means exhausted the 
potential o f  existing relations o f  production. But even in 
these countries there are signs of an emerging social-democratic 
consensus (as I would describe the prevailing attitude of
13 In M. Crozier et al. {op. cit.), p. 115.
14 Al Smith quoted in M. Crozier et al. {op. c it.). W illy Brandt said in his first 
policy statement as Chancellor o f  the Federal Republic in October 1969: 
“ Wir mussen mehr Dem okratie wagen” .
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advanced modernity). It is benign, informed by a tradition of 
openness and helpfulness, inclined to support the maintenance 
of the creaking institutions of the post-war world or perhaps 
their gradual reform, willing to develop the system of detente 
that has emerged from the negotiations around SALT, M BFR 
and the CSCE, and looking for ways of placating the develop­
ing countries without actually giving up the achievements, not 
to say privileges of one’s own position. Or should I say, “ our” 
own position, for this is the kind of enlightened view which is 
most likely to emerge from Western societies and which I 
share in many of its assumptions.
However, I do not share the apparent complacency with 
which this view is often defended. The fact that a large majority 
of people in the OECD  world support it does not mean that it 
is bound to prevail. In fact, the more striking and more im­
portant development is the emergence o f  two quite different 
views at the fringes o f  the orthodoxy, views which carry the 
positions which I have described to Professor Huntington and 
Willy Brandt to their extremes and will dominate much of 
the international as well as the internal debate o f  the future.
The first is the authoritarian view. It is in some ways 
reactionary in the strict sense of the word. There is a tendency 
to react to the contradictions of modernity by saying that we 
have in fact had too much o f  it. What is needed today — in 
the view of  those who react in this way — is, first, the protection 
o f  privileges already achieved. There is no need for expanding 
opportunities any further. Secondly, conditions must be 
re-created in which the familiar mechanisms o f  growth start 
working again, a little unemployment perhaps as a stimulus 
for discipline, some lowering of the real wage, the expulsion 
of immigrant workers, in any case a new attitude to law and 
order: there is a syndrome here which is as consistent as it is 
worrying. And since some o f  its features appeal to all who are 
frustrated by the discovery o f  limits of growth and by other 
corollaries o f  modernity, it is conceivable that this reactionary 
approach will gain more and more ground.
In any case, this is more likely than that of the opposite view, 
the  demand for more democracy will make great inroads in the 
foreseeable future. This is actually a rather confused position, 
o f ten  taken by members o f  the new educational class allegedly 
o n  behalf o f  working people, but without any real basis in the
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interests o f  known social groups. There is a sentimental streak 
here; social benefits must be extended rather than cut. There 
is a strong environmental concern without much understand­
ing of its implications for growth. There is much insistence on 
participation, again without concern for growth or even for 
the constitutional prerequisites o f  change. The need to take 
the demands o f  developing countries seriously has an important 
place in the sentimental household of this view, again without 
realization of the fact that participation by all and low econo­
mic growth will hardly help it.
I do not want to sound condescending in describing this 
particular view, often ascribed to a vociferous though imprecise 
left today. In fact, I have much understanding for these 
sentiments, and much concern about the effects o f  the hard 
reactionary line which seems to prevail so often in day-to-day 
politics. But this is not the place to weigh pros and cons of 
domestic political positions. What I want to do in concluding 
this summary analysis o f  social changes in contemporary 
societies is to try and assess in rough and inevitably speculative 
terms some o f  the consequences o f  these changes for inter­
national relations. They are three, and I am afraid none of 
them is particularly pleasing.
First, it is evident from this analysis that after a period in 
which Western attitudes were by and large reliable we are now 
moving into one o f  greater unpredictability and instability. 
This is where 15 August 1971 and 6 October 1973 have their 
significance. It is no longer possible to assume that countries 
will necessarily take the view which they have been known to 
take for the last decades. Sometimes, negotiators will still 
take this view, but they will find that it is no longer supported 
at home. Sometimes, a completely new type o f  negotiator 
will emerge, rough, self-interested, unprepared to listen. While 
the old institutions continue apparently as usual and even 
consider their gradual and piecemeal reform along familiar 
lines, entirely new pressures and forces emerge in their member 
states. It is perhaps not irrelevant to point to the fact that some 
surprising politicians with primarily domestic interest and 
experience have been made foreign ministers in recent years; 
it may well be that the days of the diplomacy of powers are over.
The second conclusion which one is bound to draw is that 
there will be a drawing-in o f  attitudes, views and indeed
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interests. I have intimated that the majority o f  people were 
probably at all times protectionist. The advantages o f  free 
trade are not easy to understand. But at a time when growth 
has become more problematic in general, and when unemploy­
ment is almost a necessary consequence of growth, such inward- 
looking attitudes will spread. I have little doubt that we are 
going to see vastly increased pressures for protectionism in 
the Western world, and that from time to time, even responsible 
politicians will find it difficult not to yield to them. Protec­
tionism in trade terms is only a specific form of the much more 
general trend, parochialism, the concentration on one’s own 
frustrations. Meetings between heads of government turn less 
into joint plans of action than into wailing symposia which 
leave everyone with the one consolation only, that everybody 
else is in the same miserable condition. Parochialism separ­
ates, perhaps frustration does in general. It is difficult to draw 
much encouragement from observation or analysis of inter­
national behaviour these days.
This, thirdly, will leave the developing countries in a state 
of direct and indirect frustration. I shall turn to this subject 
at greater length in my fourth lecture. All I want to say at this 
stage is that there is nothing, but nothing in the social develop­
ments of modern countries that opens them to a better under­
standing of the plight and the needs of the Third World. They 
are not only looking inwards, but also bent on defending 
privilege. They may pay conscience money, or yield to certain 
institutional pressures; but it is difficult to see the signs which 
would lead one to predict a longer-term understanding of 
the problem.
I have said that my conclusions would be rather pessimistic. 
This they are. But I must not finish this sketch without making 
two short points. One is that general analyses mislead inter 
alia because they overlook the creative effect o f  difference. 
The fact that there is a Holland and a Sweden makes an 
enormous difference to attitudes towards developing countries. 
The fact that there is a Japan is in itself a guarantee for the 
continuation o f  some degree o f  free trade. The fact that there 
is a United States of America may well turn out to be a 
guarantee for change without upheaval remaining possible after 
all and the institutions of  liberal societies surviving. The 
o th e r  point is that in any case social developments are slow
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and their effect on foreign policy is tenuous. After a cautious 
introduction I have had to make many assumptions which 
the expert in the field might well dispute. There is no simple 
derivative relationship between foreign policy and social 
developments (even if we assume that these can be described 
in an unambiguous way). The trap of populism is real, and 
one o f  its versions is the sociological interpretation o f  inter­
national relations. Thus there are many reasons to believe 
that at least some of my conclusions are wrong, although I 
hope that there are at least some reasons to believe that many 
of my underlying analyses are right.
LECTURE III
EUROPE: A MODEL?
Winston Churchill, one o f  the architects of the post-war world 
order, has always regarded European integration as a necessary 
condition of the new system. His reasons were both specific and 
general. As he pondered the future in 1942, he saw the ascend­
ancy of the United States and the Soviet Union and began to 
fear a world dominated by these two powers. Commenting on 
a joint memorandum of the State Department and the Foreign 
Office on international cooperation, he said that “ a form of 
United States of Europe” was desirable as a component. This 
was to safeguard the specific interests of Europe and enable the 
old continent to make its peculiar contribution. A little later, 
Churchill turned this particular concern into a general principle. 
In a conversation with Henry Stimson and others in Washington 
in 1943, he argued that the United Nations could be effective 
only if it were not merely policed by four great powers (he was 
still including Britain in them, of course), but if it was based 
on a number of regional alliances. At the time, and with the 
limited horizon of the time, he mentioned three possible 
“ regional councils” for the Americas, the Pacific region, and 
Europe . 1
It is relevant to compare this design for a combination of 
regional and universal institutions with one developed by Rajni 
Kothari more than 30 years later.2 Kothari argues in 1974 
th a t  the United Nations system has been a “ miserable failure” 
in p a r t  because it left the poor nations isolated and the weak in 
a w o rld  community that was too distant to be meaningful. In 
order to  give them the advantages of scale, and the world com­
munity an  effective grounding, regional alliances are necessary,
Cf. M. Hagem ann: op. c/7., p .319 sqq.
R. Kothari: Footsteps Into the Future (N ew  Delhi 1974).
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or as Kothari puts it, “ a territorial restructuring o f  existing 
nation-states with a view to combining the values o f  autonomy 
and self-respect o f  individual states with the values o f  justice 
among men and non-violence within and between states” .3 
Kothari identifies no fewer than 24 world regions, taking into 
account complementarity o f  resources as well as geographical 
contiguousness, but allows for a gradual development o f  “ unity 
in diversity” and notably, diversity.
The relationship between regional cooperation and a world 
order is obviously a matter o f  fundamental importance, and has 
been such ever since the world order which is now growing old 
was first created. A fascinating account of post-war interna­
tional history could be written as a history o f  the failure of 
regional alliances. There are the regional agencies o f  the United 
Nations, sometimes effective, sometimes not, but in any case 
imposed from above rather than created from below. There are 
ambitious projects of  regional cooperation which were probably 
too comprehensive to have any chance of  success; Latin America 
offers several examples, such as the Declaration of  Buenos Aires 
o f  1970, Africa has the Organization of African Unity. There 
are more modest alliances based on proximity or a common 
cultural heritage, but it would be difficult to point to one that 
has succeeded. The Arab League has had, to put it mildly, its 
ups and downs. No one speaks today of the economic coopera­
tion agreement between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Some of 
the regional agreements which have to some extent been fash­
ioned on the experience o f  the European Communities have 
been more successful. This is not strikingly true of the Andean 
G roup whose Accord o f  Cartagena is almost a copy o f  the Treaty 
of  Rome on which the European Economic Community is based; 
differences between nations have turned out to be too great to 
allow much progress. There are such differences even in the 
Central American Common Market (Honduras, Guatemala, 
San Salvador), though on balance this has been successful. And 
while the Association o f  South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
suffers somewhat from Indonesia’s preponderance in size and 
economic strength, considerations of defence, that is, o f  active 
neutrality, have held it together for a decade.
This list is far from complete, and yet it gives an indication
3 R.•Kothari: op. cit., p .149
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of the chaos which attempts at regional cooperation have left 
behind. In some areas, notably in Africa, recent decades have 
in fact been a period o f  deregionalization; the common markets 
of the colonial states have been replaced by nation states and all 
their traditional trimmings, including tariffs. Almost every­
where, it has turned out to be exceedingly difficult to persuade 
countries to join forces, or indeed to create forces by joining. 
Before this background, the story of European integration 
stands out, even if it has — as we shall see presently — its own 
anti-climaxes and disappointments. It is a relatively consistent 
story of international, even supranational cooperation. Thus 
it may be that there is something to learn from this story. The 
history of the European Community is important in itself for 
world economic and political relations; but the question which 
we will bear in mind throughout is whether there are features 
in it which make it exemplary in any way for the world of 
Winston Churchill and Rajni Kothari, or whether these 
ambitious designs need to be corrected in the light of experience.
The story of Europe begins with the motives for European 
integration .4 In fact, these were a far cry from Churchill’s lofty 
notions, or even K othari’s assumptions about national interest. 
On one level, these motives were, to be sure, European. There 
was the memory o f  the tender beginnings o f  Franco-German 
friendship in the 1920s at the time of Stresemann and Briand; 
this time, it was felt, the attempt had to succeed. There were 
economic interests, both among the big countries and companies 
who felt that they had to join forces to survive, and among the 
smaller ones who needed a larger economic space, a common 
market. Many of  the leaders of post-war Europe were o f  the 
same political persuasion, notably Adenauer, Schuman, and 
de Gasperi, as well as the Christian Democrats o f  Holland, 
Belgium and Luxemburg. Above all, there was the Soviet 
threat. While American forces were deployed all over the 
continent, Europe was obviously the prime target of aggression; 
it needed to stand together to defend itself.
A s we descend further into the lowlands o f  national politics, 
the  motives for European integration become even more varied 
and parochial. There was the desire of those who had been 
occupied by Germans during the war to contain Germany. The
4 Some o f  the following paragraphs are abridged versions o f  passages from
my book: Pladoyer fu r  die Europaische Union (M unich 1973).
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Federal Republic itself saw Europe as a welcome opportunity 
to regain recognition and influence. Influence was also an 
important consideration for the smaller powers whose role 
was otherwise minimal. Add to that group interests, French 
concern for farmers, German concern for exports, Italian 
concern for regional development and opportunities through 
labour mobility, and a strange balance of advantages emerges 
which has little to do with the high ideals of Churchill’s Europe 
as a pillar of the international system.
There were those o f  course who did not believe in such a 
Europe at all: the nationalists, notably in France; and the 
mondialistes, notably in Germany and Holland. We shall return 
to their arguments, because their doubts are clearly important 
for any assessment o f  the success or failure o f  regional coopera­
tion. But before we do so, let me look at some of  the intrinsic, 
and perhaps exemplary problems of European integration.
The problems begin with geography, with political geography 
to be sure. W ho or what is Europe? There are many answers 
even to this preliminary question, and it is to some extent arbi­
trary to pick but one o f  them. The CSCE had 35 participants, 
32 if we leave out the Soviet Union, the United States and 
Canada. Although some of these (like Iceland and Malta) are 
on the margin o f  Europe, and others (like the Vatican, San 
Marino, Andorra and Liechtenstein) powers of a special 
kind, the participants of the CSCE describe the geographical 
area called Europe. Politically of course, there are at least 
two Europes, East and West, and three if one counts the non- 
aligned and neutral countries separately. In this lecture, I am 
not going to deal with Eastern Europe. In the West, a whole 
series of organizations have been discussed; some foundered 
before they were set up, others had their day of glory, very 
few survived. The OECD started as O EEC; today, 19 West 
European countries are among its 24 members. Its importance 
is to provide a forum for coordinating economic policies 
rather than to produce a European view. The Council of 
Europe with 19 members is today a monument to its past, 
although its Convention of Human Rights remains important 
and has led, after the colonels had taken over in 1967, to the 
removal of Greece. The European Defence Community 
never got off the g ro u n d ; it foundered along with the European 
Political Community in the French parliament in 1954. The
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West European Union with its seven members was designed 
to control arms, especially those of Germany, and is now one 
of the ruins of the attempts at integration.
Any survey of European institutions ends up therefore with 
the European Communities. Since 1967, this is the name of the 
combination o f  the European Coal and Steel Community, the 
European Atomic Energy Community, and the European 
Economic Community. The European Communities have at 
present nine members; these are likely to increase to 10 soon, 
and probably to 12 before long. The EC has special relation­
ships with nine remaining EFTA countries in North  and 
Central Europe. It encompasses four of the smaller prin­
cipalities and republics. In fact it is not only the effective 
spokesman of the developed democratic countries o f  Europe, 
but also includes the majority of them among its members or 
associates. It is not unreasonable therefore to follow current 
usage and refer to the European Community in the singular.
This is not the place to describe the development o f  the 
European Community in any detail. We are concerned with 
the world order, and with Europe’s role in it. But it is relevant 
to remember that the strongest single motive force o f  the Euro­
pean Community up to 1970 was the creation of  a customs 
union, a common market. This process had at least four aspects. 
First, there was the reduction and eventual abolition o f  internal 
tariffs, completed in 1970 (though mitigated by the continued 
existence of taxes and other tariff-like barriers to trade). 
Secondly, there was and is the concern of the Community with 
abolishing as many non-tariff barriers as possible. This process 
ranges from metrication through joint patent rules to labour 
mobility and is of enormous complexity. Indeed, in a sense 
every distinctive feature of a society is a non-tariff barrier to 
trade, so that the process is likely to be forever unfinished. 
Thirdly, there were areas in which trade was not governed by 
tariffs and related barriers, but by deliberate policies; this is 
true notably for agriculture. In these areas it was therefore 
necessary to evolve a common policy to go with the common 
market. The Common Agricultural Policy is the most im­
portant result of  this approach. Finally, a customs union 
inevitably has an external aspect. The common commercial 
policy of the Community has consequently developed into 
one of its major features.
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By the spring of 1970, the first major objective of the Euro­
pean Community, the customs union, had been achieved. 
The question arose therefore: What next? To the present 
day, the European Community has found it difficult to give 
a clear answer to this question. The summit conference o f  The 
Hague in December 1969 established the famous French trip­
tych of policies —  achevement, elargissement, approfondissement. 
Achevement meant the completion of the customs union. 
Elargissement, the enlargement of the Community, has since 
been a central concern of its institutions, first with respect to 
Britain, Denmark and Ireland (as well as, unsuccessfully, with 
Norway), since 1977 for Greece, Portugal and Spain. Im­
portant as this is, it is easy to see that by itself enlargement does 
not strengthen a community; and many would argue that it 
serves to weaken its internal cohesion. Approfondissement, the 
third wing of the triptych, the deepening of cohesion and 
cooperation, has so far failed signally. The objective of the 
early 1970s, economic and monetary union, was shattered in 
the monetary storms following 15 August 1971. The energy 
crisis following the Yom Kippur War of 1973 exposed the 
weakness of European cooperation dramatically. No other 
overriding objective has emerged at a time at which econo­
mically and to some extent politically European countries 
have moved further apart rather than closer together. If 
there are any signs of progress, they are in regular consultations 
on matters of foreign policy which have been developed under 
the name of Political Cooperation since 1971, and in the revival 
of, again intergovernmental, plans for monetary cooperation 
in 1978 (EMS), as well as institutionally the twice-yearly 
meetings of heads of government in the European Council.
Before this background, let me examine the contributions 
which the European Community has made to the world order, 
concentrating on points at which its community character was 
important for making a contribution at all. Three matters 
deserve our attention here, trade, aid to development, and 
political cooperation.
It is often said that the creation of a customs union is one of 
the main reasons why the six original members o f  the European 
Economic Community experienced a period o f  considerable 
economic growth throughout the 1960s. In fact, trade between 
member states o f  the EEC has increased considerably, both in
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absolute terms and in terms of its relative importance for the 
balance o f  trade of  members.5 This has contributed to their 
economic success; it has also created a considerable degree of 
social and political interdependence. However, it is impossible 
to quantify the effect o f  the customs union on growth, indeed, 
it may be argued that it has succeeded, because it was created 
at a time of considerable growth opportunities. Europe has 
followed, and corroborated, the trend. The creation of  the 
common market was part of a world-wide movement towards 
free trade. When the European Community supported this 
movement actively, notably during the Kennedy Round of 
tariff reductions, it acted in accordance with its obvious interests 
which were shared by many countries outside the Community. 
Either way, however, it remains true that Europe has been a 
driving force towards an international economic system of 
free exchange as a motor of expanding production and con­
sumption.
Several reservations have to be added to this statement. One 
is that it applies to industrial trade, but not to trade in agricul­
tural products. Like other producers, the EC has sought, and 
found ways of protecting domestic agriculture. The system of 
the common agricultural policy (CAP) was complicated at the 
best of times; it is chaotic now that monetary upheavals haVe 
destroyed its backbone, the unit o f  account (called “ green 
dollar” and preserving for history the value of  the.USS before 
15 August 1971). The CAP uses prices in order to guarantee 
farmers’ income, regulate production in accordance with 
demand, and protect domestic products against imports at one 
and the same time. Whatever its internal effects, this system has 
not made the emergence of a world market in agricultural 
products, or even a concern with the quantity and quality of 
world demand more likely. Nor is European protectionism 
confined to agriculture. Wherever domestic problems arose, and 
notably in recent years, the Community has been used to nego­
tiate self-restraint by importers, or impose straightforward pro­
tectionist measures. In this respect too, the EC has followed the 
trend. Here, as elsewhere, the Community found it difficult to
Both imports and exports o f  EC countries have grown since 1958 at rates
above those o f  the US and others. The proportion o f  intra-EC trade o f  the
total trade o f  EC countries has roughly doubled since the creation o f the
Community (from about one-quarter to about one-half).
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resist national pressures. Since the Kennedy Round, and in any 
case in exchanges between different systems, international 
economic relations have been less and less concerned with the 
regulation o f  trade through tariff's and similar measures, and 
more with the creation o f  trade through credit, joint ventures, 
and the like. However, member states of the EC have inter­
preted the relevant articles of  the Treaty o f  Rome narrowly and 
reserved to themselves all trade creation policies. Today, while 
the EC continues to conclude commercial agreements with 
countries all over the world, its actual importance as an instru­
ment o f  commercial policy has become very limited indeed.
The story of the second major area of international operations 
of the EC is somewhat happier; this is the story of aid to 
development. In one respect at least, it is linked with trade 
policy. When developed nations considered the introduction 
of generalized system of tariff preferences (GSP) for developing 
countries, public and parliamentary debate in most of them 
aroused all the forces of protectionism. The EC was not only 
among the first to introduce GSP in 1971, but also included in 
it more items than most.6 In fact, this was an example of the 
more liberal members dragging the less liberal ones along in a 
community.
This is also true with respect to the central features o f  the E C ’s 
development policy, the agreements first of Yaounde, more 
recently of Lom e.7 (And while, with respect to trade, it was 
France that had to be dragged along, with respect to develop­
ment, it was Germany.) The agreements to associate first 19, 
now, after British entry, 46 countries o f  the developed world 
has met with much criticism, notably in the United States. It has 
been described as an example of regionalism destroying 
universal rules, even of neo-colonialism of a kind. In fact, the 
important agreements are neither. They are not neo-colonialist, 
because they give the associated countries of the ACP group 
(African-Caribbean-Pacific) an equal say in the Council of 
Association, and do not produce any factual dependence 
either. They are not in any negative sense anti-universal,
6 In 1976, the EC’s G SP system allowed a total o f  $4-5 billion o f  industrial
products duty-free into the Com m on Market.
7 The first Yaounde Agreement came into force in 1964, Yaounde II in 1970.
The Lome Convention was concluded in 1975 for a period o f  five years in
the first instance.
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because it is clear that no one is today in a position to contribute 
to economic development everywhere to the same extent. A 
choice has to be made. It is true that there are what are often 
called historical reasons for the choice of the European Com ­
munity; but other countries with similar historical ties to 
members (India, Indonesia) have not been included. The 
ACP association is a deliberate attempt to concentrate limited 
resources to the greatest possible effect. It is, in the words of 
Claude Cheysson, EC Commissioner for Development, “a 
useful complement to what can be done on the world level” .8
The Lome Convention has many features which are worth 
mentioning. The Development Fund is the largest EC fund 
apart from the one that arises for technical reasons out o f  the 
common agricultural policy. But the most important aspect of 
the Lome agreement is probably the “ stabex” scheme designed 
to guarantee export earnings to developing countries, or at any 
rate to insure them against considerable fluctuations over the 
years. This is, to be sure, not a market scheme. It has been, and 
continues to be, the subject o f  controversy in Europe; and when 
similar projects were vented in the context of the North-South 
Dialogue, the countries of  the EC were not united. But as part 
of the Lome agreement, financial arrangements to counteract 
fluctuations of commodity prices have been accepted; and this 
may well contribute to providing an element of minimal stability 
to many. In our context, the development policy o f  the Com ­
munity is important for two reasons. One is that it shows 
Europe at its best, and closest to its proper interest. The other 
reason is that it shows what a Community can do above and 
indeed beyond the attitudes taken by some of its members.
There is the EC’s commercial policy, its development policy, 
and, thirdly. Political Cooperation. This is naturally a much less 
tangible area of  activity, and one in which it is not always easy 
to keep lofty words and practical actions apart. “ Europe must 
be capable o f  making its voice heard in world politics, and of 
rendering the independent contribution which corresponds to 
its human, spiritual and material capacities, and according to 
its calling for world openness, progress, peace and cooperation 
represent its own conceptions in international relations.” This
C. Cheysson: “ The Policy o f  Europe Towards D evelopm ent” , in P. Uri
(ed.), N orth-South: Developing a New Relationship (Atlantic Papers 6/1975),
p.38.
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is the language o f  the Paris Summit of 1972, the first in which 
the new members including Britain participated.9 Since then, 
heads of political departments of  foreign offices, ambassadors 
in the capitals o f  the world, foreign ministers and heads of 
government o f  the EC have met on many occasions. In some 
cases, they have hammered out a joint position. This was nota­
bly the case in a number of international conferences, such as 
the final summit of the CSCE in Helsinki, the Special Session 
of the United Nations on Development in 1974, or the North- 
South Dialogue. In many cases, including economic summits 
of the Seven and ministerial meetings of the IM F and other 
organizations, no joint position was worked out, but thorough 
consultations were held.
It is difficult to assess the effect of Political Cooperation at 
this stage. It has clearly moved some of the member states in 
their foreign policy by nuances, if not more. It has brought 
France a little closer to the United States, and Germany to a 
better understanding of Arab positions, for example. Perhaps 
its most important effect is one on which Andrew Shonfield 
laid great stress in his Reith Lectures on Europe: the “ habit” 
of cooperation has been strengthened, so that today each 
member of the EC would regard it as necessary to consult 
with the others before major decisions are taken .10 Relations 
have become easier, more direct and more relaxed. The sense 
of community has undoubtedly been strengthened. Yet if one 
is to draw the balance of this story of Europe’s place in the 
world, it is not very satisfactory. The European Community is 
probably on balance in black figures, that is to say, it has 
contributed to improving international conditions here and 
there, and it has made its members more effective actors on the 
international scene. At the same time, Europe is a long way 
away from its manifest destiny. The beautiful ideals of the 
Paris Summit have not become real; much less is this the case 
if one speculates about what might be called the European 
interest. This is a complicated concept, to be sure, even more 
complicated than that of national interest. Yet I believe that 
there are a number of points which can be spelt out as being
4 Final Com m unique of the conference o f  heads o f  state and government, 
Paris, October 1972.
10 Cf. A. Shonfield: Europe —  Journey to an Unknown Destination  (London  
1973).
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in the obvious interest of the members of the EC as such. Let
me try to do s o :
1. Europe neither includes a superpower nor is it a superpower 
itself. While most countries of Europe have had their day as 
superpowers o f  past centuries or even decades, few, if any, 
serious politicians today entertain such dreams. In fact 
Europe consists of  small and medium-sized powers. If  it ever 
forms a community, it will have to be based on respect for 
small powers. This has restrictive consequences: in a world 
of superpower warfare, Europe will not be able to defend 
itself. It also has useful consequences: in a world of power 
dissipation, Europe is more likely to understand, and be 
appreciated by, other small nations than the superpowers, 
actual or potential.
2. Small and medium-sized nations cannot rely on a free- 
floating power game; they need institutions and inter­
national organizations. Direct relationships between centres 
of power always presuppose a degree of self-sufficiency. 
Small powers are not self-sufficient; they are interdependent 
with others in almost every aspect of their existence. This 
means that in the end the only guarantee of their survival 
is in the creation and observance of rules that bind nations. 
The countries of Europe may find it difficult to build their 
own community; but in so far as they have succeeded, such 
constructions were and are based on equality of all members. 
Europe has a natural interest in strengthening all other 
institutions in the field of economic and political relations, 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
3. Europe’s geographical position gives it a special interest in 
terms of security (and this applies to Europe in any sense of 
the term). N ot being able to defend itself, it has to be pro­
tected by a superpower. Such need for protection, however, 
remains coupled with the desire for independence. This is 
why there is, in Europe, a manifest interest in detente both 
in the specific sense of superpower agreements on disarma­
ment (with mutual and balanced force reductions, MBFR, 
high on the list), and in the general sense of the creation of a 
climate that extends the room for manoeuvre for individuals 
and  tor countries. This makes for a tense mixture of interests, 
a nd  will do so for some time despite the changes in world
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patterns that are the main subject of these lectures.
4. The countries of Europe vary widely not only in their 
tradition and culture, but also in their social, economic and 
political condition. This is clearly true in terms of the great 
divide of systems; but it is true on either side of the great 
divide as well. West European societies include the market 
economy of West Germany, the old etatisme of France and 
the welfare state socialism of Britain as well as Scandinavian 
brands of social democracy, South European conflicts 
between traditional ruling groups and their subjects, and 
other variations. Recent economic developments have 
moved these countries further apart; the exchange rates tell 
the story. Indeed, it is conceivable that their internal 
variations will lead to what is sometimes called the balkaniza­
tion of Europe, with individual arrangements in the absence 
of a recognized community of interest, a Bonn-Washington 
axis, an alliance of Latin socialists and communists, a 
strengthened Northern union, and Britain in self-imposed 
isolation. There is another equally likely possibility, and 
that is that Europe will understand that there are many ways 
to happiness. Europe will thus provide a model of plurality 
against the natural inclination of the superpowers to dog­
matize their own experience.
5. Europe’s colonial past can be and has already been turned to 
advantage. Perhaps it can be said that the colonial experience 
of the European nations has now been superseded by an 
active development policy of the European Community. 
The agreements of Yaounde and Lome are clearly on the 
credit side of European integration; they show that com­
bination of understanding of the requirements and even the 
idiosyncrasies of developing countries with an insistence on 
economic viability which is most likely to be successful in a 
difficult period of North-South relations.
One need but formulate this list of points to realize that so far 
Europe has not lived up to its potential. This is a serious and 
important fact. There are many people, and even governments, 
all over the world who feel a need for a non-military superpower 
along the lines o f  Europe’s best possibilities. It is no accident 
that the European Commissioners for External Relations and 
for Development are warmly welcomed when they go abroad 
to Africa, Asia or Latin America. (Nor is it an accident that they
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meet with some scepticism not only in Moscow, but in a different 
way in Washington as well.) Without wishing to overstate the 
case, I feel that one can say that the world needs E urope ; it needs 
the policies which would arise from the European interest which 
I have indicated; but Europe seems incapable o f  realizing this 
need. Why should this be so?
There are many reasons, and some at least are bad. The 
memory o f  national glory is still strong in Europe. There are 
those who seek in the European Community a substitute for lost 
grandeur, and who want it to be a superpower in all respects. 
For some o f  those Euro-nationalists at least, the nation remains 
a viable alternative. They use the EC wherever they find this 
inevitable, but otherwise pursue their national objectives. This 
is often pathetic, like France’s force de frappe, or some of the 
claims of  the extreme left and extreme right in the British House 
of Commons, but it is nevertheless real.
Then there is the fact of the complex relationship between Eu­
rope and the superpowers. East European countries are under 
military domination by the unloved Soviet Union. The relation­
ship between the EC and the US is much more intricate, although 
the fact that for its defence, Europe is ultimately dependent on 
the United States is o f  pervasive significance. Ever since the late 
1960s, and a fortiori after 15 August 1971, Europe and America 
have tried to work out a partnership of equals. Prematurely, 
success was claimed for this attempt by Secretary of State 
Kissinger in his speech about a new Atlantic Charter on 23 
April 1973. In fact, one is not talking about a new charter, but 
about a precarious balance of mutual dependence, military, 
economic, and in the defence of human rights and political free­
dom. For some in Europe, working out such a partnership is 
made more difficult by an underlying resentment of things 
American; for others, by a particularly close, indeed a special 
relationship with the United States. Whatever one may think 
about its answers, successive French governments have cer­
tainly posed a necessary question by giving the European- 
American relationship high priority. Recognizing the Euro­
pean interest presupposes and implies a new partnership 
between Europe and America.11
One other reason for Europe’s difficulties in recognizing the
Of the many studies o f this relationship, let me mention but two —  K. Kaiser:
Europe and the United S ta tes  (W ashington 1973); R. M organ: The United
States and West Germany, 1945-1973  (L ondon 1974).
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European interest must be mentioned. It has to do with our 
analysis o f  the impact o f  social changes on international rela­
tions. Economic concerns with maintaining the status quo give 
rise to protectionism rather than openness. Social developments 
accentuate this attitude. Many people seek today less inclusive 
social units in which they want to participate; they distrust the 
nation-state, let alone supranational organizations. The new 
parochialism certainly does not help Europe on its way to 
defining its place in the world, and probably makes it more 
difficult.
The interim balance of  our inspection o f  the regional contri­
bution to international relations is thus riddled with question 
marks. Even if such a contribution is possible, strong forces 
militate against it. Memories o f  national glory, the overweaning 
position o f  the superpowers and the new parochialism are but 
three o f  them. N ot only is the one region on which we have 
focussed threatened in its internal cohesion, it is also hamstrung 
in its external policies. Can Europe, under these circum­
stances, be described as a model of regional cooperation? 
What is the case for — and against —  regionalism, taking into 
account the varied experience of the European Community?
Let me begin to answer these questions by having a look at the 
nation-state, of which I have spoken so far merely by implica­
tion, and by negative implication at that. It is true that in a 
number of respects the nation-state has become an unsatis­
factory political space. In the developed world, people would 
tend to look in two directions to substantiate this statement. 
They would probably begin by saying that in many cases the 
nation-state is too big to offer people any real chance of 
participation. There is therefore a growing demand for 
participation in less inclusive units, for community politics, 
industrial democracy. Important as this is, in our own context 
the other, and to some extent contradictory direction of develop­
ment is more relevant. Today, the nation-state can no longer 
guarantee either security or prosperity. Given a high degree of 
technological development, military security requires alliances 
except for the very big; and given a high degree of division of 
labour, economic prosperity requires rules of exchange which 
extend far beyond national boundaries. Extreme nationalism 
under modern conditions is a prescription for poverty and 
insecurity.
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But I must add a point. It has often been claimed that the 
nation-state is dead; yet this creature has shown extraordinary 
resilience. In many developing countries, it is not only a symbol 
and instrument o f  autonomy, but also a condition of  modern­
ization; however absurd the boundaries of nations may be in 
social terms, they constitute for that very reason entities which 
cannot rely on traditional ways of defining allegiances. The 
nation-state provides a framework for generalized citizenship 
rights which the extended family, the village and the tribe 
cannot easily give. In the developed countries, nation-states 
have shown obstinate resistance to supranational institutions. 
Whether people feel more at home in familiar boundaries, 
whether traditions of legal and political institutions forbid 
supranational integration, or whether a general crisis of social 
identity makes people suspicious of new and to some extent 
artificial units, nation-states have remained real and important. 
We have to start our analysis with a paradox: nation-states 
are both real and lacking; they will be with us, and they will be 
unable to cope with some of the central issues of peace and 
prosperity.
Assuming for the moment that it is true that world-wide insti­
tutions have failed to provide the framework for peace and 
security, and that in any case the old world order is under strain, 
the question arises whether regional alliances of  one kind or 
another can serve this purpose effectively, and moreover, 
whether they can be regarded as effective stepping-stones to a 
functioning new world order. In my view, the answer to these 
questions cannot be simple, but on balance it is probably slightly 
negative. Regional organization may be necessary; but this is 
so because we are unable to establish a satisfactory world order 
rather than because they are building blocks o f  such an order. 
Regional organization is second-best and as such not very satis­
factory.
Let me begin with its good sides. Undoubtedly, Kothari is 
right when he points to the need to base inter-national coopera­
tion on “ salient linkages” rather than abstract moral principles 
which carry little weight in practice. He is a realist, and therefore 
emphasizes political and economic rather than cultural links; 
but the very fact that there are cultural links, say, between 
European, or Arab, or groups of African countries makes 
iegional cooperation that much more likely. I suspect that Ko-
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thari is much less right when he says that “ the need for regional 
consolidation is real not so much for the world as a whole but 
for the two-thirds of it that is poor and divided” 12. One can see 
the point o f  the demand for more solidarity as a condition of 
effectiveness in the international scene. But even apart from the 
fact that regional consolidation is more likely among older 
nations which have already had their day, it is also more effective 
in their case. K othari’s Region 5 ( “ the EEC Region” ) can, by 
joining forces, become an effective actor in international affairs, 
counterbalancing the superpowers and taking a lead in North- 
S ou th  re la t io n s .  K o t h a r i ’s R egion  8 on the o th e r  h a n d  
(“ English-speaking West Africa” ) may provide some advantages 
to its members but is not very likely to become a major force 
internationally. As such, regional cooperation does not 
produce power.
This takes me to the first critical comment on regionalism. 
There is an evident danger that regional cooperation will lead to 
little less than the rebirth of nations on a slightly larger scale. It 
is probably stirring a beehive to say that there may be a case for 
such somewhat larger national units in parts of the developing 
world; in any case, they would not make much of  a difference. 
The more important lesson from the European experience is that 
apart from the threat o f  a reversal to nationalism there is also 
the threat o f  a European nationalism. This may take the form 
o f  the arrogance o f  power; it is as likely simply to strengthen 
social trends which impinge on foreign policy in any case. 
Europe’s protectionism would be even more impregnable than 
that o f  its member states, and in this respect at least a kind of 
Gresham ’s law is more likely (“ In a regional alliance, all follow 
the most inward-looking” ) than the opposite. If  there is any 
lesson from the European experience, the danger o f  the region 
behaving like a nation, only more so, is not to be overlooked.
But the more serious objection has to do with the meaning of 
the regional space in economic and political terms. There is one 
concept — one reality, to be sure —  which I have not mentioned 
so far in this analysis, that o f  the multinational, o r transnational 
company. These creatures have been the subject o f  much vitu­
peration, public and private, international and national. Yet the 
very least that must be said about them is that they have been
12 R. Kothari: op. cit., p. 156.
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very effective in exploring relevant spaces for economic expan­
sion. Not surprisingly perhaps, it is a radical economist who 
states: “ The multinational corporation, because o f  its great 
power to plan economic activity, represents an important step 
forward over previous methods of international exchange. It 
demonstrates the social nature of production on a global scale. 
As it eliminates the anarchy of the international division of 
labour, it releases great sources of latent energy.” 13 In M arx’s 
terms, one might well argue that the multinational company is 
the greatest single force o f  production emerging in the last 
decades.
But undoubtedly, Stephen Hymer is right also when he adds 
that “ as it crosses international boundaries, it pulls and tears at 
the social and political fabric and erodes the cohesiveness of 
national states” . 14 Our relations of production — social and 
political structures — are unable to contain the new forces of 
production; or put more simply, we do not know how to cope. 
There are those who would like to pull the great corporations 
back to the spaces for which we have political institutions, that 
is, to break them up and turn them into national corporations 
again. Like nationalism, this is a prescription for poverty and 
insecurity. In the European Community, attempts have been 
made to devise a regional system of transnational economic 
activity in the form o f  the European company. A model com­
pany act for a European company has been drafted, public 
accountability, workers’ participation and all. But there are no 
takers; the political space of the European Economic Com ­
munity is not strictly relevant for economic expansion today. In 
order to make economic expansion possible, there has to be 
flexibility in principle by unlimited combinations and permuta­
tions of national markets. No line of geographical boundaries 
makes any sense as a restriction of multinational economic 
activity, not even the great divide between the superpowers. If 
we accept that the multinational company is a great and effective 
force of production, and if we want both to use it and to prevent 
it from pulling and tearing at the social and political fabric, the
S. Hymer: “ The M ultinational Corporation and the Law o f  Uneven Devel­
opm ent” , in J .N . Bhagwati (ed.), Economics and World Order (N ew  York-
London 1972), p. 133.
S. Hymer: op. cit., p. 133.
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only answer is world-wide rules of trade, of monetary relations, 
and of public accountability.
Thus it may appear as if I am after all a mondialiste, seeking 
universal international institutions wherever possible. To some 
extent I am; and I shall give some of my reasons in the two 
remaining lectures. Yet I would not wish to be misunderstood. 
The need for world-wide rules arises out of the compelling 
objective both to use and to control the means at our disposal 
for advancing human welfare everywhere. It is not as such the 
epitome of what is desirable. In fact I have much sympathy 
with the notion that “ small is beautiful” , or more precisely 
perhaps, that we should not construct a world which is too 
distant and too technical to allow people to participate in it or 
even understand it. My mondialisme is strictly limited to those 
areas in which universal institutions are a necessary condition 
of peace and prosperity. Apart from these, there are social 
problems, in the solution of which nations, states and counties 
within them, local communities, organizations and places of 
work have an important part to play. It is in this context that 
my attitude to regional integration can be expressed as well. 
Throughout, I believe, the presumption should be in favour 
of smaller units: as much decentralization as possible, as much 
centralization as necessary. What can be done locally, should 
be done locally. What cannot be done locally, should be 
tried in the next biggest unit first, say, nationally. What cannot 
be done nationally, should be tried regionally; there clearly is 
a case for regional cooperation. But we are likely to find that 
some important issues cannot be resolved on this level, or even 
by cooperation between regions. If we want to advance people’s 
life chances, it is no good being romantic about this fact: 
we need world-wide rules and institutions.
LECTURE IV
FROM UNBALANCED 
DEVELOPMENT TO INTER­
NATIONAL CLASS STRUGGLE?
The fact that there are many millions of people in several parts 
of the world who live below the poverty line (however it is 
constructed) is morally unbearable, economically unnecessary, 
and politically explosive. Yet there are powerful factors at 
work to prevent change, both within poor societies and among 
the rich. When the world order which we now call old was first 
created, lack of awareness was one of these factors. One o f  the 
early aid-giving agencies of the United Nations, U N R R A , was 
concerned with the millions of refugees wandering all over 
Europe and the Mediterranean world, and with relief for East 
European countries. The first coherent international develop­
ment plan was the Marshall Plan of 1947; it served the 
reconstruction o f  the economies of war-destroyed Western 
Europe. Even the World Bank was, and is, called the Inter­
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development and spent 
most of its funds in the early years in Europe and Japan .1 At 
that time, the countries which we now call developing countries 
or ldc’s, were only gradually emerging from colonial rule to 
independence. By 1960, this process was well under way. The 
International Development Agency was created within the 
World Bank system; the United Nations announced the first 
Development Decade. But in the years to come, another 
concern overlaid the interest in development in the developed 
world, the conflict between two ways o f  getting rich (as I have 
called it), between East and West. There were beginnings o f  a 
greater awareness of poverty in the world; but much energy 
was absorbed by defence, by fending off' war from Berlin to 
Cuba, or carrying on war from Czechoslovakia to Vietnam.
Even in 1964, one-third o f the disbursements o f  the W orld Bank went to
industrialized countries.
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The end of these wars and detente have gradually changed this 
concern. I have argued that the East-West conflict is in fact 
receding in importance, and that North-South relations are 
emerging as the dominant theme of international relations. 
But as this happens, the question with which I began gains 
added urgency: Why is it that despite a heightened awareness 
o f  the problem o f  development it seems impossible to remove 
even the most flagrant inequities of the world society? I shall 
try to throw some light on this question, but as I do so, we 
shall not find much light in a gloomy scene of  poverty and 
discrimination.
Let me begin with some economic facts and, for a moment 
at least, take the standard indices o f  development for granted. 
In fact, I shall not merely take them for granted, but look at 
the way in which one of these indices is made up, so that the 
prevailing notion o f  economic development becomes apparent. 
Hollis Chenery and Moyses Syrquin, using World Bank data 
and no doubt a World Bank approach, regard per capita G N P 
as the main index of development, and trace the transition 
from a mean income of  under $100 to a mean income of over 
$1 000.2 Their data allow 10 statements about conditions and 
corollaries of development: (1) In terms of investment, transi­
tion means a gradual reduction of capital inflow with an 
accompanying increase in savings and re-investment. (2) In 
this process, both government and tax revenue will grow 
steadily. (3) There will be a steady rise in education expenditure 
and a rapid increase in the school enrolment ratio. (4) The 
structure of domestic demand will show a steady proportional 
decrease in private consumption, including food, and an 
increase in government consumption. (5) The structure of 
production will be characterized by a rapid decline in the 
primary share and a steady increase in the industrial share, 
with the service share growing somewhat in the later stages. 
(6) The structure of trade will show an increase in exports, 
with manufactured and service exports progressively replacing 
primary exports, whereas imports will remain stable. (7) In the 
allocation of labour, the primary share will decrease slowly at 
first and extremely rapidly in later stages, whereas the shares
2 Cf. H. Chenery and M. Syrquin: Patterns o f  Development 1950-1970
(W ashington-London 1975). The ten “ basic processes” or “structural
characteristics” can be found on p.6 sqq.
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of industry and services will both increase steadily. (8) There 
will be rapid urbanization. (9) The demographic transition will 
show a steady decline in the birth-rate throughout, coupled 
with a rapidly declining death-rate in the early stages. (10) The 
relative advantage of the highest 20 per cent o f  incomes will 
increase for some time until gradually the old differentials are 
re-established.
These statements map the road which developing countries 
have to take if they are to reach the goal of economic develop­
ment. Chenery and Syrquin realize that cross-section data do 
not necessarily describe time-series. Moreover, there are 
important differences between large countries and various kinds 
of small countries (primary-oriented, manufacture-oriented, 
balanced). But the external and internal obstacles on the road 
to development are known — and so is the fact that very few 
countries have been able to overcome them so far. By the 
standards of Chenery and Syrquin, there were 14 larger 
developed countries in 1950; another nine had graduated by 
1970.3 The gap between these and the poor countries is 
enormous. If one compares income per capita as between the 
richest and the poorest 10 per cent o f  the world population (in 
1970), the differential is 1 3 :1 :  $85 per head per year for the 
poorest tenth, $1 100 for the richest tenth.4
Nor is there any chance at all of “ closing the gap '’ in the 
foreseeable future, indeed within the next half century or so. 
Even if the process of transition takes place, the ldc’s will not 
only not catch up with the lucky 23 of the club of the rich, but 
they are likely to be even further away from them in absolute 
terms, though there may be a slight improvement in relative 
terms. Robert Gardner has put it succinctly, if with frightening 
precision: “ If countries at the level of $3 000 per capita income 
per year, grow at 2 per cent — which is a very modest growth 
rate ... — and if countries at $200 a year per capita grow at 
6 per cent — which would be a rather ambitious objective — it 
is obvious that [the former] grow at $60 per capita per year 
and  the poor countries at $12 per capita per year. So the abso­
lute growth rate, the absolute gap, seems destined to grow in
H. Chenery and M. Syrquin: op. cit., p.23. The list does not include a number
o f smaller countries.
Cf. J. Tinbergen (Co-ordinator): Reshaping the International Order (London
1977), p .87.
the foreseeable future and for the remainder of this century.” 5 
Even the most optimistic scenario of Jan Tinbergen’s report 
would only reduce the differential between developed and 
developing countries from 13:1 in 1970 to 13:4 by 2012; the 
more likely scenario would leave it at 13:2, or even 13:1.3.6 
Developing countries have in fact experienced a period of 
considerable growth in G N P  since the early 1960s, the average 
of which is not far from 5 per cent. But given a population 
condition of high birth-rates and declining death-rates, this has 
for the most part resulted in a much more modest increase in 
G N P per capita, and in some cases in no increase at all. The 
additional fact that in the early phases of development income 
inequalities tend to increase — that development benefits a 
small elite rather than the mass of the people— justifies the 
statement that a large number of people have in fact become 
poorer.
This of course is not true in all developing countries. In 
considering these general figures, one must be aware o f  the 
fact that there is not only a Third World, but a Fourth World 
as well. Much of what I have said, does not hold for a number 
of countries which may be called threshold countries, because 
they have reached the threshold of full development. They 
include some of the OPEC countries with their absurdly high 
average per capita GNP. (In these terms, the United Arab 
Emirates and Kuwait are of course leading the world league 
today.) They include above all some countries which have 
made headway by half a dozen or more of Chenery’s and 
Syrquin’s criteria. Some are quite small, like Singapore; some 
middle-sized, like South Korea; some quite large, like Brazil; 
Latin America, East and South East Asia, and the shores of 
the Mediterranean are the regions from which the next 10 
members of the club o f  the rich are most likely to come.
This then is the picture from which we shall s ta r t : In terms of 
economic development, there is a First World of rich countries 
which, even if they do badly, are going to remain on top o f  any 
league of economic performance unless catastrophe descends 
on them from outside. Then there is the Second World o f  fairly 
rich communist countries which will have some way to go before
R. Gardner: “ New Proposals for D evelopm ent” , in P. Uri: op. cit., p.20. 
6 J. Tinbergen: op. cit., pp.9 3 -9 6 .
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they “ catch up” with the First World, though they are very 
much better off than the ldc’s and are likely to remain so, 
because if anything their productive forces are greater than 
their economic and political system allows at present. About 
20 per cent of the world’s population live in the First, and 10 
per cent in the Second World. The size of  the Third World is 
much harder to estimate, if we include in it all those who are 
likely to reach the magic threshold of 1 000 (1965) dollars by 
the end of the 1980s; a good guess might put it at 10 per cent 
of the total world population.7 This leaves about 60 per cent of 
all people, or at any rate the major part of them, in the Fourth 
World of countries which, even if they grow, will not make the 
club of the rich for a long time, indeed, for whom basic human 
needs are in jeopardy.
But then, what are we talking about? Are we talking about 
basic human needs or American-type patterns o f  affluence? 
What sort of concept of development is it that underlies the 
statistical tables of the World Bank and of economic literature 
in general? Are we taking one, Western, standard for granted 
and forgetting about the needs o f  people in a more fundamental, 
more genuinely humanistic sense? These questions have been 
asked, not by Western intellectuals who speak from the secure 
vantage point o f  affluence, but in the developing world itself. 
I speak about them with diffidence; it is not for the members 
of the club to preach austerity to those who are out. But some of 
the issues raised in the debate about development are of  critical 
importance for a future world order, and I can therefore not 
leave them out of consideration.
The first step of this debate is relatively simple; it has been 
raised by economists of the World Bank themselves. Essentially 
it consists in the answer to the question: If  the gap between 
the rich and the poor cannot be closed in the foreseeable future, 
what should we concentrate on in our development policies? 
Various answers, some rather technical, have been given to this 
question; but in recent years there is an increasing tendency to 
concentrate on what is called a human-needs approach rather 
than rely on the benefits o f  industrialization sooner or later
The percentage figures are based on estim ates about countries. The main
imprecision o f  estimates o f this kind lies in the fact that one would wish to
consider not merely countries, but regions and groups within them.
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trickling down to all. This is not dissimilar from what hap­
pened in the developed world itself, say, around 1900 when 
Rowntree’s index of property and Booth’s materials on the 
London Life and Poor made people aware that the advantages 
of capitalism were by no means obvious to all. If  we talk about 
the right to a minimum wage, to adequate food and shelter, to 
protection from sickness and the accidents of life, but also the 
right to an education and even to a job, we are defining some­
thing that may by itself, be out of the reach of many developing 
countries today, but is a viable objective for the foreseeable 
future. Basic human needs define the floor on which everybody 
should stand and stand upright. In discussing remedies, I shall 
argue that this is the way to turn, and that development policy 
should be about such basic rights in the first instance.
The next step o f  the development debate is more complicated, 
and you may find what I have to say about it rather Western, 
but I shall still say it loud and clear. I have mentioned the case 
o f  Germany in one o f  my earlier lectures and said that where 
modernization occurred late and happened rapidly, the human 
price o f  the process was high. Today, one is bound to conclude 
that the countries which have gone some way along the road 
of transition are also the ones in which human rights are least 
respected, democracy is trodden on, and every additional 
per capita dollar is payed for by the life or liberty o f  many 
individuals. Brazil is no democracy nor is Iran, South Korea 
is no democracy nor is Algeria; there are reports of torture 
and arrest without warrant or trial from these countries as 
from many others. Indeed, there are times when in some despair 
one feels that India’s return to democracy and civil liberties 
was possible among other things because her economic predica­
ment is so hopeless. The picture is not entirely bleak. Greece, 
Spain and Portugal have recently shed the yoke o f  tyranny and 
returned to habeas corpus and basic political rights without 
abandoning the objective of economic progress. But such 
examples are few, and one of the most pressing, but also 
oppressive questions o f  the contemporary world is: Can we 
combine economic development with respect for the funda­
mental rights of man, and notably the inviolability o f  the 
human individual? And let me be clear and add that this is not 
a question o f  capitalism or even democracy Western-style. I 
find it quite conceivable that capitalism is not an effective
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method of progress in the new countries, and I can even see 
(though not condone) the limits of democracy. But the 
question of human rights is more fundamental, and it is totally 
indispensable. Again, I shall argue that it is one of the building 
blocks of a new world order.
This leads me to the third and most philosophical question 
about economic growth in the developing w orld : the question 
of whether development Western-style is desirable at all or not. 
The question is agitating quite a few intellectuals in the 
developing world. (And it is not irrelevant to add that some 
Western intellectuals have begun to question the orthodoxies 
of modernization in quite similar ways.) Let me take Rajni 
Kothari’s careful and intelligent attempt to trace Footsteps Into 
the Future as an example, because I believe that it reflects the 
search for a peculiar identity which is widespread in Asia and 
Africa, and to some extent in Latin America as well.8
Kothari confronts East and West in a way which has nothing 
to do with the East-West conflict; it is indeed much closer to 
the South-North conflict. The West, he says, has “ developed 
a peculiar world view and philosophy of life known as 
'modernity’” .9 This world view emphasizes science and 
rationality; but as it comes to apply these principles it loses 
sight of their original objective and turns into a blind technology 
of progress, movement for movement’s sake, an empty striving 
for “ freedom from want and scarcity and from unpredic­
tability” . 10 The Eastern world view is by contrast more 
philosophical; it emphasizes m an’s relationships with man and 
nature which the Western view destroys. “ Impressed by the 
perennial flow o f  time and the fact that a particular era or social 
form was inevitably transient, the Oriental thinkers saw folly 
in m an’s search for a better and still better life in society.” 11 
But the Western view prevailed, or seemed to prevail. N ot only 
did it conquer its prodigal son, communism, or at any rate 
re-unite with him (“ both capitalism and communism have been 
increasingly modified by a common middle-class elite to 
converge into the model of a bureaucratic state . . .” 12), but “ on
s R. Kothari: op. cit.
R. Kothari: op. cit., p .25.
R. Kothari: op. cit., p .25.
R. Kothari: op. cit., p .26.
R. Kothari: op. cit., p .33.
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the whole, the great civilizations of the East succumbed to the 
onslaught of the West” . 13 For the developing world, this has 
meant that “ the impact of modernization has resulted in 
growing disparities, a pervasive dualism in cultural and eco­
nomic levels, and expropriation of the benefits o f  modernization 
by a small upper-middle class” .14 Kothari argues that it is 
important to try and reverse this process, and that this is also 
possible. Centralization can be countered by regionalization, 
industrial development by concentration on the agricultural 
sector, but above all the analytical approach o f  the West by an 
“ integral view of  man, society and nature” .15 The underlying 
concentration of power in such an approach “ at once empha­
sizes m an’s capacity to intervene in the social process and 
obliges him to build ethical and institutional safeguards so that 
such intervention does not result in unrestrained expansionism 
and self-indulgence” . 16 Ethical restraint is dictated by the four 
guiding values o f  the process of social development, o f  which 
sight must never be lost: autonomy, justice, non-violence, and 
participation.
The importance o f  this intellectual tour de force  is that it is 
not merely intellectual. Practitioners may not agree with all 
that Kothari and others like him have to say, but some of  them 
at least conjure up similar experiences and hopes; and it may 
be no accident that they have caught the imagination of many 
inside and outside the developing world. President Nyerere of 
Tanzania stands for an austere and incorrupt indigenous 
socialism which prefers gradual change growing out o f  agri­
cultural development to rapid G N P  growth. President Gaddafi 
o f  Libya wishes to stand for the seemingly impossible attempt 
to combine economic success by any standard with the main­
tenance of  traditional, in his case Muslim values and patterns 
of  society. Behind individual leaders of relatively small 
countries, there looms myth and reality of  the two largest 
developing countries. India has chosen to abandon not only 
the assault on hum an dignity implicit in population control by 
force, but also the blind industrialization of its early years;
13 R. Kothari: op. cit., p .23.
14 R. Kothari: op. cit., p .55.
15 R. Kothari: op. cit., p.46.
16 R. Kothari: op. cit., p.45.
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Prime Minister Desai represents a more cautious, and above all 
more Indian, village-based approach to development. And 
China has been said to do many things, the more so the less one 
knows about the country, including the effective conquest of 
hunger and perhaps the satisfaction of basic human needs in 
the context of social values of solidarity and cohesion.
Such examples require more extensive analysis than I can 
give them here. I am bound to say, however, that I am less 
impressed by their real face than by some of the ideas behind 
them. The combination of modern riches and traditional values 
is costly. We do not know how many millions have died or are 
held in camps in China, though it clearly is a society which 
affronts human dignity by pervasive control and organization; 
and we do know that Libya has become an advocate of violence 
and brutality outside its own borders, and to some extent, 
inside them as well. India and Tanzania, on the other hand, 
leave too many economic questions unresolved, including 
questions of basic human needs, although no one can fail to 
respect the dignity and honesty which is so characteristic of 
these countries.
I have called Kothari intelligent, indeed wise, and the reason 
was that he is in fact not simply contrasting two views. He not 
only criticizes the occidental world view but says; “ We must all 
come to terms with the West, the crucible of modern scientific 
achievements without which an overcrowded planet cannot 
survive.” 17 In other words, he is not advocating an alternative 
view which is simply the antithesis of the Western experience 
of modernization, but he is exploring a synthesis which 
combines the enormous advances in life chances attained by 
economic growth with the individual strength and satisfaction 
given by a more social, indeed, more humane set of values. 
The statement which I find crucial in his analysis is this: 
"Whereas social justice entails a high rate of growth o f  GNP, 
such growth does not ensure justice.” 18 What we have to 
look for is both economic development and socio-cultural 
autonomy. Whether this can be done may be an open question; 
as an objective, it is clearly both plausible and convincing.
There is one other reason why it is important to insist on
both economic opportunity and socio-cultural cohesion, and
R Kothari: op. cit., p .36.
R Kothari: op. cit., p.69.
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that takes us back to the main line of our argument. Arthur 
Lewis, in countering a familiar claim, made a shocking, though 
clearly correct statement: “ It is fashionable to believe that the 
prosperity of the industrial countries rests on their exploitation 
of the underdeveloped. Actually, if you add all the exports 
from Asia, Africa and Latin America together, the total comes 
only to per cent of the national incomes o f  industrial coun­
tries. If Asia, Africa and Latin America were all to sink under 
the sea, it would make a negligible difference to the present 
and future prosperity of Europe and North  America.” 19 
For the time being, it may well be that the rich can live without 
the poor, although I shall argue that to the extent to which this 
is so, it cannot last. But there is an argument on the part of 
some representatives o f  developing countries which insists on 
their autonom y to such an extent that it sounds as if they in 
turn do not need the developed world and should go it alone, 
for moral if not for economic reasons. I believe that this 
argument, while understandable as an expression of genuine 
pride, is fallacious, indeed, dangerous. Interdependence is a 
fact, and will become more so. Opting out of an interdependent 
world is not a sign of autonomy, but to some extent of coward­
ice, of the inability to cope with complex conditions. The 
question is not whether we can live without each other which 
we cannot, at any rate not for long, the question is how we can 
live together while mutually respecting our autonomy, our  right 
to be different, as well as the rules which help all of us along 
the road to general citizenship and the prospect, if not the 
reality of prosperity.
These are optimistic words about a condition o f  which I must 
now show that it gives little reason for optimism, and may be 
on the way to becoming desperate. I have talked about some 
o f  the obstacles in the way of recognition o f  the need for a 
balanced process of development. There was the obstacle of 
awareness, and the obstacle o f  genuine interest; both have 
been removed. There is the obstacle of economic disparity; and 
we need much imagination and new approaches to overcome 
it. The old notion of development aid may have been helpful 
to enable the new governments of new countries to establish 
themselves; it may have contributed to the formation ot 
semblings o f  an indigenous middle class; but its effects on
19 W. A. Lewis: Som e A spects o f  Economic Development (Accra 1969), p.!5sq.
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human needs are, if not minimal, then highly lacking, and 
the relationship between developing and developed countries 
which it establishes is fraught with problems. I am not arguing 
against an increase in the percentage of the G N P of rich coun­
tries which should be spent on aid to 1 or even 1-5 per cent; but 
I doubt whether by itself this increase has any important effect 
on the problem at issue. For the developed countries it is 
conscience money, and for the developing countries it is a 
double headache in that it makes them dependent again and 
promotes inequality within them. However, the deepest and 
most serious obstacle to a balanced process o f  world develop­
ment is neither political in the sense of awareness and concern 
nor economic in any limited sense; it is social and has to do 
with the rigid structures of the world society (if such exists at 
this point). President Nyerere has put the point, which I want 
to make, as early as 1961 when he said: “ Karl Marx felt there 
was an inevitable clash between the rich of one society and the 
poor of that society. In that, I believe, Karl Marx was right. 
But today it is the international scene which is going to have a 
greater impact on the lives of individuals ... And when you 
look at the international scene, you must admit that the world 
is divided between the ‘Haves’ and the ‘Have-nots' ... And 
don’t forget the rich countries of today may be found on both 
sides of the division between ‘Capitalist’ and ‘Socialist’ 
countries.” 20 The last point was apposite at the time of  the 
Cold War and is probably generally accepted today. But 
the main thesis is not. We are passing through a period — so 
Nyerere argues — in which the class struggle which we have 
experienced within advanced societies over the last century or 
so is replicated on the international level. There are those who 
control access to wealth and those who are excluded from it 
(to use somewhat more Marxian terms than Nyerere did); and 
the signs are that their conflict will end in violent upheavals.
The thesis is of such enormous importance that I want to 
spend the remainder of this lecture examining it. For it is also 
by no means obviously true, and we will reach a rather more 
tentative though, not a less gloomy conclusion.
1 he class struggle in M arx’s sense has two main conditions. 
One is that two social groups are inextricably linked with each 
other in one context in which one side cannot lose and the
Quoted by A. A. M azrui, in J. N. Bhagwati (e d .): op. cit., p.288.
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other cannot win. The other is that they represent underlying 
forces o f  which one becomes more and more rigid and unable 
to adapt, whereas the other has the future on its side and is 
eventually bound to explode the whole system and remove the 
privileged from their place. In fact, the history o f  the societies 
to which M arx’s theories primarily applied, have turned out to 
be more complicated than he anticipated, especially with 
respect to the expected final explosion. Ruling classes and 
dominant patterns o f  social structure showed themselves 
remarkably adaptable. The “ have-nots” , on the other hand, 
have in due course found quite a comfortable place in their 
societies; for them, the thesis of progressive immiserization has 
become an intellectual phantasy of no relevance. Thus, the 
revolution was not necessary in most places; there was no 
inexorable law of historical development that led one side to 
disappear in the abyss o f  history and the other to conquer its 
peaks on the wings o f  the world spirit. But emphasis on the 
resolution of  conflict rather than its explosion pre-empts the 
results o f  our analysis as we look at the application o f  this 
model to the international scene.
The first question to raise concerns the extent to which One 
World in fact exists today. Undoubtedly, the rich and the poor 
o f  the modern world are linked in numerous ways; but what 
about the point made by Arthur Lewis that the rich can live 
without the poor, difficult though the poor may find it to survive 
without the rich? There are those of course who doubt that 
this is true today. The thesis that the wealth of  the rich is based 
on the systematic exploitation o f  the “ external proletariat” of 
the poor has become the stock-in-trade o f  Marxist analysis 
o f  international affairs. I submit, however, that there is much 
less to this thesis than many believe. Undoubtedly, the 
availability o f  cheap resources has made a difference to in­
dustrial development in the West. But in its early phases at 
least, that is, in the beginning of transition, these resources 
were found within and not outside. Later, considerable 
differences between the dependence of  countries on their 
colonies developed. Britain was more dependent than France, 
France more than Germany, Germany more than Japan, Japan 
more than the United States — and the latter three did not need 
an external proletariat to exploit at all. Moreover, there was 
not a lot to exploit in the colonies in any case. While I find
Peter Bauer’s conclusions too self-satisfied to be acceptable, his 
facts are undoubtedly right when he points out that the colonial 
masters not only provided the beginnings of an infrastructure 
in their dependencies, but also discovered the resources which 
would not have been exploited without them: tea in India, 
rubber in Malaya, and so on.21 The dependence of raw 
material producers was, for the rich of today, a convenience 
and not a necessity.
If this seems to bear out Arthur Lewis’s point about dispen­
sability, any dynamic look into the future refutes it quickly. 
If we assume that the advanced countries need further economic 
growth for domestic as w'ell as international, and economic as 
well as social and political reasons; if we assume that there are 
countries on the threshold o f  full development which want to 
get across it; and if we assume that the poor nations o f  today 
need economic development to survive, let alone to advance — 
then any one o f  these assumptions is enough to warrant the 
conclusion that whatever interdependence exists today is bound 
to be strengthened in the next decade. If there is not one world 
today, there will be one world tomorrow, because the developed 
countries need large economic spaces to advance, the threshold 
countries need to stand on the less fortunate and hold on to 
the privileged, and the poor cannot pull themselves out o f  the 
rut by their own hair. The more difficult question is what will 
happen if we make all three assumptions at the same time 
(which is not an unlikely prospect), that is, if everyone wants 
to do better. Here, a depressing scenario emerges which may 
well describe the battlefield of international relations in the 
1980s and beyond.
The developed countries are faced today with a series of 
obstacles to continued growth. While one can understand the 
hope that their growth rates should exceed an average o f  2 per 
cent per annum over the next decade, it is by no means certain 
that it will come true. Among the obstacles are saturated 
internal and external markets, side effects o f  technical progress 
on unemployment, the cost o f  the welfare state and its reproduc­
tion, changing expectations and attitudes, and the obligations, 
if any, towards the developing world. O f these obstacles, some 
appear inevitable, whereas others can be removed, at least for
I. P. Bauer: Dissent on Development. Studies and Debates in Development
Economics (L ondon 1976).
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a while. The saturation o f  markets is more apparent than real; 
in theory at least there is an enormous world demand for the 
goods which developed countries produce. Much o f  this 
demand is o f  course in the developing countries o f  today; in 
this sense the rich have an interest in letting the poor become 
sufficiently well-to-do to be able to afford their products. By 
the same token, however, they have no interest in seeing their 
own growth potential jeopardized by competition from 
developing countries, especially if such competition benefits 
from relatively cheap labour and other comparative advan­
tages. In this respect, the spreading mood of  protectionism, 
of looking inwards and preserving what one has got rather 
than expose it to threats, supports evident economic interests. 
Developed countries neither have to nor want to do much to 
assist the ldc’s along the road of transition.
I regard cynicism as an indefensible attitude at any time, and 
I do not intend to be cynical; but my conclusion from the 
analysis of the short term interests of the developed world is 
that there is little to suggest an interest in taking the poor much 
beyond the $200 threshold on which the World Bank places 
much emphasis. At that stage, capital inflow has already been 
replaced to a considerable extent by re-investment and savings, 
but exports are still very largely primary exports with imports 
at a consistently high level. I am not saying that this is necessary 
for the rich, or even that it benefits them much, but it is not in 
their interest to go much further, and that means, they will not 
make efforts to help countries to advance further along this 
road. In fact, this limited support contained by self-interest 
describes exactly what the developed countries are doing. Their 
aid is restricted and creates little competition; their imports are 
largely imports of primary products, and it costs little to give 
guarantees against extreme price fluctuations; their exports to 
ldc’s are still rising; and multinational companies link developed 
and developing countries in such a way that both benefit but 
the latter do not challenge the former. So far, the countries 
of the OECD world have not made the slightest real sacrifice 
at all in the name of development; and it is difficult to see the 
forces which would bring them to change their attitude.
Growth o f  the threshold countries is no more helpful for the 
ldc’s than growth of the already rich. The example o f  the oil 
crisis of 1973 is sometimes quoted to show the muscle which
the less-developed have. Such an interpretation is, however, 
more than a little misleading. While it is true that the quin­
tupling of  the price o f  oil within three years has fueled world 
inflation and aggravated balance of payments problems in 
some developed countries, the effect on developing countries 
was much more destructive. There is a direct connection 
between the great jum p ahead of the OPEC countries, and 
destitution and starvation in India, Bangladesh and a number 
of African countries. Again, the OPEC countries may have 
paid some conscience money — little enough in view of  the 
enormous quantities of cash which they have added to the 
world money markets — but their primary objective was, and 
is, a kind of  embourgeoisement on a world scale. They want to 
be members of the club of the rich, and if anyone has to pay a 
price it is the countries o f  the Fourth World. This pattern is 
repeated in all threshold countries, whether they have oil or not.
It is clear that this process will leave the poor countries of 
today in an extremely precarious state. Probably, the factors 
mentioned will take some of them beyond the first two or three 
markers of transition; but if this scenario is correct, there will 
be no chance at all o f  an average growth rate of 6 per cent in 
the next decade. On the contrary, the immiserization o f  the 
poor countries will continue, and it will take on an increasingly 
unbearable form at least in some areas. The fact that small 
groups even in these areas are doing relatively well will not 
conceal the prevalence of extreme poverty. Neither nationally 
nor internationally will the theory of percolation, according 
to which wealth gradually trickles through from the top to the 
bottom, work.
At this point, let me return for a moment to Marx. His 
theory of revolution had among others one flaw which is 
demonstrated by much empirical evidence since his day and 
before. Marx believed that the capitalist system would of 
necessity lead to the immiserization of the proletariat (which 
was, as we have seen, wrong), and he also believed that the 
explosion, the revolution, would occur at the time of greatest 
poverty and destitution. The moment o f  extreme need (he 
would say with a play on words22) is also the moment of extreme 
necessity of change. But this is not so. The lumpenproletariat 
is not a very strong revolutionary force, nor are the very poor;
It is a play on the German words Not for need and Notw endigkeit for necessity.
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they are more likely to become lethargic than aggressive. 
Revolutionary change occurs when things begin to look a little 
better, and when there is hope that if only existing forces of 
change are released, there will be a major improvement on one’s 
condition. Moreover, such radical changes are not brought 
about by the massive organizations of the deprived themselves; 
they require spokesmen and organizers, in other words, leaders. 
Someone has to define the revolutionary situation for the under­
privileged and persuade them that the slight improvements 
which they have seen can be infinitely extended.
Such experiences can probably be applied to the international 
scene today. In so far as there is going to be One World, it 
will clearly be a world o f  extreme disparities, with few forces 
at work to reduce and overcome them. But the under-privileged 
of this world are not very likely to organize themselves effec­
tively. They do not have enough clout to force the privileged 
to make the necessary concessions. However, the day may come 
on which the world will have grown together even more. The 
rich will need the poor to maintain themselves. For one reason 
or another the condition of the poor will improve somewhat. 
This is the time at which it is conceivable that someone will 
set himself up on the international scene as the spokesman of 
the poor and downtrodden, someone with nuclear weapons 
perhaps and with a considerable per capita G N P as well as 
impressive social cohesion. This is the scenario in which the 
international class struggle might erupt into a world revolution 
and upset prevailing structures of power and prosperity 
fundamentally.
This is not likely to happen for some time, however, and it 
need not happen at all. I have drawn a fairly depressing picture 
o f  North-South relations, because I believe that it is necessary 
to get away from facile statements and empty promises. The 
world is in a mess, and it is quite likely that the mess will get 
greater before it is sorted out. But it would be wrong not to 
add that there are signs o f  improvement. In some countries, 
government opinion and perhaps even public opinion are 
beginning to recognize the problem. While percolation may 
not work, there are attempts to pull more and more countries 
onto the raft o f  the survivors. In some large developing 
countries, self-help is a viable principle. The European Com­
munity has shown some initiatives towards a more rational
FRO M  U N B A L A N C E D  D EVELO PM EN T TO  CLASS S TR U G G LE? 69
relationship. While the North-South Dialogue has yielded 
little so far, it is carried on and constitutes a reminder o f  the 
seriousness o f  the issues. Most world-wide organizations 
are today organizations about development; to U N CTA D , 
U N ID O  has recently been added. The World Bank, so often 
quoted in this lecture, has done a great deal to satisfying human 
needs, under the vigorous direction of Robert McNamara. 
The much-scorned multinational companies with their strong 
sense o f  survival have found it useful in many places to con­
tribute systematically, if perhaps willy-nilly, to self-reliance 
and independence.
M arx’s prognosis about capitalist countries has turned out 
to be wrong because these societies showed a greater ability to 
change without revolution than he credited them with. The 
class struggle, instead o f  deteriorating into revolutionary 
violence, was domesticated and made fruitful for people rather 
than destroying their livelihood. This is what the international 
agenda o f  development is about in the years to come: to 
persuade all comers that before long there will be one world 
and no one will be able to shrug off the plight of the other, and 
to make sure that in time institutions are set up which help us 
to transform a world o f  crying injustice into one o f  fairness and 
equity by non-violent means. I can put the issue no better than 
in the words o f  Jan Tinbergen in his Report to the Club of 
Rome: “ It must be made clear that the Third World is not 
demanding massive redistribution of the past income and 
wealth of  the rich nations. It is not seeking charity from the 
prosperous nor equality o f  income. It is asking for equality 
of opportunity and insisting on the right to share in future 
growth. The basic objectives of the emerging ‘trade union’ of 
poor nations is to negotiate a ‘new deal’ with the rich nations 
on the basis o f  reasonable demands through the instrument of 
collective bargaining and participation. In attempting to secure 
greater equality o f  opportunity, they are simply insisting on 
the right to sit as equals around the bargaining tables o f  the 
world.” 23
J. Tinbergen: op. cit., p. 16.
LECTURE V
ELEMENTS OF 
A NEW WORLD ORDER
The world order which has served us for nearly a third o f  a 
century is creaking; here and there, it is beginning to crack. It 
has served some well, others not so well; but for all it has been 
much less effective since its silver jubilee around 1970 than 
before. I have talked about some of  the symptoms and causes 
for this change. It may well be that the process o f  reform which 
has already been set in motion in nearly all the great inter­
national organizations will succeed. Fo r  that to happen, how­
ever, it would have to be so radical as to amount to the creation 
o f  a new world order by itself. If  this does not happen, and some 
of  the old institutions find themselves condemned to irrelevance 
forever (for most o f  the time institutions do not die, they fade 
away to insignificance without cutting jobs or salaries for their 
servants), then the need for a new world order will be even 
more evident. Either way, the time has come to consider some 
of the elements which might usefully enter into this process of 
reconstruction.
As I begin to do so in this last lecture, there is one question 
which looms large, because I seem to have taken it for granted 
for too long: W hat is a world order? W hat are international 
organizations about?  Why is it, in other words, that we have 
to think about a world order at all?
One reason is peace. We cannot eliminate conflict from 
either human life, or from groups, countries and even regions. 
In fact, we should not want to eliminate conflict. It is one of 
the great creative forces o f  human history, preventing men from 
going to sleep and letting their affairs slide into barren nothing­
ness. Conflict is creative; it brings out m en’s best capacities; 
it is the source o f  progress. But conflict has to be domesticated 
in order to develop its true creativity. We need norms, by which
we carry on our disputes, rules o f  the game and referees and 
modes of appeal, or else conflicts will destroy the opportunities 
which they could create. This is why we need government in 
our societies. This is why we need international organizations.1 
It was of course one of the motives of the founders of the 
old world order.
Another reason for world order is prosperity. With m od­
ernization, the accompanying division of labour and technical 
innovations, untold opportunities of prosperity have been 
opened up. But many of them require acceptance of a new 
scale of things. By itself, the village, the region, even the nation, 
can neither produce nor maintain prosperity. There is a wide, 
probably world-wide interdependence of producers and con­
sumers of resources, goods and services. The founders of the 
old world order have seen their multiple linkages to some 
extent, though for them, “ the world” was still a rather small 
world in which many parts figured as resources rather than 
participants. The economic institutions of the old world order 
were not truly world-wide; those o f  the new world order will 
have to be.
There is a third reason why we need to think about a world 
order, and that is citizenship. I have used the word to de­
scribe what has happened in the First and the Second Worlds, 
and what may be a part of the process of modernization every­
where. There is a promise inherent in what we have come 
to call modernity, and the promise is that ultimately all men 
have the same chance of participation. I have shown also that 
in the developed world the promise is about to turn sour. It is 
difficult to draw the line between the opportunities of citizen­
ship and the oppressive equality of actual conditions. Yet this 
line must be drawn if we do not want to destroy the promise of 
modernity in the process of realizing it. But on a world-wide 
scale we have a long way to go before this issue even arises. 
Here, the realization o f  citizenship itself is still the overwhelm­
ing issue. The world in which we are living is very far from 
being a world of citizens throughout. As was true on the 
national level some time ago, the reasons are a complex mixture
1 Social conflict theory has frequently been applied to international relations.
Cf. in particular Ch. con K rockow: Soziologie des Friedens (G iitersloh
1962); K. Boulding: Conflict and Defense (N ew  York 1962); R. Aron:
Paix et guerre entre les nations (Paris 1962).
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of economic privileges and disadvantages, social restrictions 
(conscious and semi-conscious) and political dependencies. But 
a new world order will have to aim at removing these restrictions; 
it will have to be about universal citizenship as a part o f  its 
objective.
One may wonder where I get the temerity from to say that 
this “ has to” be so. The idea o f  world citizenship is old, and it 
has been morally persuasive for many of  the best minds. When 
Immanuel Kant wrote his essay on the course of history — 
cautious and critical as he was, and without a claim to any 
special relationship with the world spirit — he argued that it 
was impossible to think of  a meaning o f  human history other 
than as one that applied to all men and therefore implied world 
citizenship.2 His essay was written in weltbiirgerlicher Absicht, 
with cosmopolitan intent. Whatever tactical or practical argu­
ments are advanced, I can see no moral case against universal 
citizenship. All men are born equal in rank, and there will be 
no just world before this fundamental equality is expressed 
in equal citizenship rights for all.
But history is not made by moralists, o r  by moral precepts. 
The important point today is that we are close to a condition 
in which the balance of power makes it a matter o f  interest to 
begin to realize world citizenship everywhere. Fo r  some, this 
is an interest to survive; if the rich resist demands for universal 
citizenship rights this will mean that they jeopardize their 
physical security in precisely the way in which the whites of 
South Africa are jeopardizing theirs by refusing citizenship to 
the majority of people in their country. For others, the interest 
is one in elementary life chances which are in principle available 
to all. The poor are not asking for something distant and un­
realistic; they are asking for what can be granted without 
detracting from peace or prosperity in any way. Indeed, the 
case which I am making is that without world citizenship there 
cannot be peace or prosperity as we look into the 1980s and 
beyond. This then is what the new world order is, or must be, 
about. But how does it come about? W hat are the elements 
that are necessary to make it capable of producing peace, pros­
perity and world citizenship? These are large questions. You 
will expect me to give some kind of answer to them. And yet I
2 I. Kant: “ Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbiirgerlicher Absicht
in his Vermischte Schriften  (various eds.).
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hope that you realize also that our answers are invariably 
pathetically inadequate to the questions we ask. The six 
elements o f  a new world order which I propose to discuss in 
my last lecture are therefore no more than elements, ingredients 
of a much wider pattern rather than the pattern itself. I shall 
return to the pattern and to the practicalities of change at the 
end of this discussion. But the form of the discussion itself 
may be taken as a testimony to my disbelief in master plans and 
grand designs in the field of international relations: the new 
world order will grow in response to strategic decisions in 
particular areas rather than result from an overall design of the 
kind that foundered on the realities of power o f  the post-war 
world and turned into a part-order of a part of the world.
The first element of a new world order has to do with security.
I have paid little attention to this subject, except in so far as 
economic stability is a condition of security in general terms; 
yet it is clear that maintaining peace remains one o f  the three 
major objectives of international relations. The transition from 
a military-strategic conflict between East and West to an 
economic-political conflict between North and South does not 
mean that security has ceased to be a problem. The old conflict 
is still with us; less inclusive conflicts have led, and will continue 
to lead to regional wars which, in an age of interdependence, 
can always spark oft' wider and unmanageable military clashes; 
the North-South conflict itself has within it the potential of 
disputes which go beyond United Nations debates and the 
breakdown of dialogue. If  we add to this picture the facts — 
in 1975, more than $300 billion were spent on armaments in 
the world, a multiple o f  what was spent on development; more 
than 10 per cent of all major raw materials were used for 
military purposes, and arms accounted for more than 5 per 
cent of world trade3 — the dimension of the problem becomes 
recognizable.
Yet I will not include general disarmament among the six 
elements o f  a new world order which I am proposing here. It 
certainly sounds right to demand that we “exert strong political 
and moral pressure on the superpowers through national and 
international actions to re-direct military expenditures towards 
development because o f  the enormous threats posed by such
Figures taken from J. Tinbergen: op. cit., p .25 sq.
expenditures to all mankind and in view of  the waste they con­
stitute of financial, material and human resources” 4 ; and even 
if one does not put much hope in the effectiveness of  such 
pressure, it should be exerted. Most experts have their doubts 
about the effectiveness o f  disarmament measures, let alone dis­
armament agencies; but they would also agree with Daniel Frei 
“ that there is no alternative to arms control — there is only the 
hope o f  a better arms control” .5 The reason why I would not 
regard this as a cornerstone of the new world order is neither 
theoretical despair nor resignation to facts of life; it is, rather, 
that the old world order has produced, in an unplanned and 
precarious way, a balance of terror which may well be the 
most effective safeguard against a universal holocaust which 
there can be under the circumstances. The plain fact is that 
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will abandon its 
capacity to “ overkill” , that is, to extinguish mankind several 
times over; but both the United States and the Soviet Union 
realize the disastrous potential of their weapons and are there­
fore unlikely to use them unless threatened in their very 
existence. Since the Nuclear Accidents Agreement o f  1971 
there have been a series of further agreements between the US 
and the USSR. We need them, but they are an assumption 
rather than an issue of the new world order.
The issue is, how proliferation of the overkill capacity can be 
prevented. W hether this is correct or not, for all practical 
purposes it makes sense to assume that the nuclear superpowers 
will not begin a devastating Third World W ar; but the same 
assumption cannot be made for others. China and India already 
have nuclear weapons (as have Britain and France who can, 
however, be regarded as part of the overall agreement to deter 
but not to use). Several other countries probably have, or are 
close to having at least crude nuclear weapons. Enrichment 
technology is no longer confined to a small club, and repro­
cessing technology — no less dangerous in terms o f  abuse for 
military purposes — is fairly widely available. It is available 
among others to a number of countries who have not signed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (N PT) of 1968 and who are 
not effectively subject to controls by the International Atomic 
Energy Authority (IAEA). Even apart from nuclear weapons,
4 J. Tinbergen: op. cit., p. 168.
5 D. Frei: Sicherheit. Grundfragen der W eltpolitik  (Stuttgart 1977); p .58.
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the dangers o f  nuclear destruction are great, and they are grow­
ing all the time. There is no greater threat to the survival of 
mankind than that o f  nuclear destruction; there is no greater 
task in the field o f  security therefore than attempts to reduce 
the risk.
The Trilateral Commission has spelt out the criteria of  risk 
reduction in this field: avoidance of proliferation of nuclear 
weapons through by-products or technologies of nuclear energy 
production; maintenance of physical security against sabotage 
and terrorism in nuclear establishments; provision of safe 
nuclear energy notably by guaranteed waste disposal; main­
tenance of environmental safety and of reactor safety.6 It is 
less easy to translate these criteria into institutional form. A 
moratorium on the export of enrichment and processing 
equipment is unlikely; the extension of the London Suppliers 
Group to suppliers and recipients is difficult; an extension of 
the NPT and the range of controls by IAEA makes little sense 
so long as the present institutions are not universal. In a 
number of places, and notably in the International Institute 
of Applied Systems Analysis in Vienna, discussions involving 
American and Russian experts are far advanced about multi­
national fuel cycles and international territories for waste 
disposal. But ultimately the question is : Who has the sanctions 
to prevent non-proliferation and reduce the risks accompanying 
nuclear energy use, whether countries have signed the NPT or 
not? Who can force countries to sign an extended N PT? The 
answer to these questions is unpleasant. It can be done only by 
the two superpowers in their spheres of influence, and by both 
of them together in the rest of the world. If  this is unacceptable, 
the risk that the world will blow itself up within the next half 
century grows considerably; it is great enough in any case. In 
this respect I share the grim optimism of Robert Heilbroner's 
pessimism. The human prospect is not an irrevocable death 
sentence, ... although the risk of enormous catastrophes exists.7
Thus the Soviet Union is doing the right thing in its own sphere 
of influence; the American President should go much further in 
putting pressure on his allies; and both should get together with 
respect to India and Pakistan, Iran and Israel, South Africa,
Cf. the report by the Trilateral Com m ission prepared by R. N. Cooper,
K. Kaiser, M. K osaka: Towards a Renovated International System  (1977).
R. Heilbroner: The Human Prospect (N ew  York 1974); p .138.
Brazil, and whatever other candidates for military nuclear 
equipment there are.
Physical security affects survival directly; but economic 
security has no less an indirect effect. The second element o f  a 
new world order is economic, and it is again about guarantees 
by a limited number o f  powers, however distasteful such an 
idea may be to all those who have nightmares about the 
“ universal Leviathan” 8. I have made much of  the instabilities 
o f  the old economic order which became apparent in 1971 and 
1973. Almost simultaneously, three great unanswered questions 
emerged: in the monetary system, floating revealed disparities 
without providing solutions to the crucial issues o f  the genera­
tion of international liquidity and the mechanism o f  adjust­
ment; in trade, two decades of liberalization gave way to an 
uncertain mixture o f  free trade, “ orderly marketing” and out­
right protectionism; in aid to development, it became clear that 
we were still in square one, and that even if simple objectives 
like making 0-7 per cent of the G N P of developed countries 
available for aid were realized, this would not touch the core of 
the problem. None of these questions has been answered since, 
not in practice, and to some extent not in theory either. As a 
result, the international economic system (if it deserves this 
term) fails to engender the confidence that is a necessary con­
dition of its functioning; it is anomic not in the sense of a 
market governed by a benign invisible hand, but in the sense 
of a war of all against all in which most find themselves on the 
losing side.
One does not need to be a monetarist to see that to re-establish 
confidence, effective and plausible monetary management is 
crucial. Money is both an index and an instrument o f  economic 
stability; and this is no less true internationally than nationally. 
For that reason, it is serious that confidence in international 
monetary management “ has been severely shaken by price 
inflation throughout the Western world, associated with an 
uncontrolled expansion of  the money supply both owned within 
issuing states and owned by banks and monetary authorities of 
other states” 9 with the result of selfish balance o f  payments 
policies and enormous speculative capital movements. This is
8 Cf. D. Frei: op. cit., p .35.
9 J. Tinbergen: op. cit., p. 199.
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where the second element of a new world order comes in.
The main requirements of the re-establishment of confidence 
in the international monetary system are reasonably clear today; 
the working groups o f  the IM F have identified them, although 
ministerial councils have failed to implement them. They are 
first, the creation o f  an effective international numeraire, or unit 
of account. With Ndegwa and Triffin one may suspect that “ it 
is now clear that this unit of account will be the S D R ” 10, 
although this fact makes it all the more important to point out 
that at present less than 10 per cent of the growth of reserves are 
accounted for by international instruments. Secondly, there 
will have to be a more stringent set of rules governing processes 
of adjusting balance of payments surpluses and deficits, and 
ruling out that balance of payments nationalism which exports 
problems of both inflation and deflation. Thirdly, and related 
to this, checks will have to be put on disequilibrating capital 
movements as a result o f  the ways in which international reserves 
are currently administered. All this will, fourthly, make it 
necessary to have another look at the alleged liberty of  floating 
currencies and the ways in which exchange rate changes can be 
held to fairly predictable limits.
A series of proposals like this will not by itself benefit directly 
the developing countries of the world. To be sure, there are 
both direct and indirect benefits of the extension of SDRs and 
rules governing exchange rates; but in the first instance, the 
restoration of monetary confidence by strengthening inter­
national arrangements will above all guarantee continued 
prosperity for those who are already developed. I have argued 
earlier that there is not much to show for the thesis that the 
benefits of prosperity must almost automatically “ trickle down” 
to those who do not share them. Clearly, the re-establishment 
of a monetary system which engenders confidence does not by 
itself satisfy elementary human needs everywhere or even the 
needs of economic development. But without such stability, 
development and the satisfaction of needs will be impossible; 
if there is any hope at all of a world order which provides 
citizenship rights for all, it is in marshalling the resources of 
human life chances that are there for more people. The alter­
native is a world of equality in squalor.
D. Ndegwa and R. Triffin: “ The International M onetary Order", in J.
Tinbergen: op. cit., p. 206.
This has a bearing on the way in which the restoration of 
monetary confidence can be brought about. Ndegwa and Triffin 
are not the only ones who fear “ that worldwide agreements, in 
this and other respects, remain thwarted by the rule o f  near­
unanimity for amendments to the Articles o f  Agreement of  the 
[International Monetary] F u n d ” . 11 Participation o f  developing 
countries, desirable as it is, has not made it easier to reach agree­
ment. There is much to be said therefore for the argument of 
the 15 leading economists convened by the Brookings Institution 
some years ago “ that for the future the leading industrial powers 
— the United States, Japan, and the European Community [as 
well as the other O ECD countries—  R.D.] — must either accept 
joint responsibility for the direction of the international 
economic system or accept a drift toward a world of restric­
tionism” .12 Here as elsewhere, regional arrangements are 
not a very plausible step towards world order. In fact, the 
value of IM F SDRs is already determined in terms of a 
weighted basket of the currencies of countries whose exports 
account for more than 1 per cent of world trade. There were 
16 at the outset; they may become 20 or so; but their number 
circumscribes the group of those who have to take responsibility 
for a system which without them cannot work. To the extent to 
which the IM F  becomes a UN-type organization it will fail 
to serve its members and non-members; if one wants to see a 
stable monetary order, one must accept the responsibility of 
those who have it in any case; though it is important to expose 
them to challenges to their narrow self-interest.
F o r  the issues of non-proliferation and monetary stability, 
there are institutions which, while imperfect, can assist in deal­
ing with the new problems, the IAEA and the IMF. Moreover, 
it is possible today to give rough indications of where these 
institutions, or others in their place, will have to look in order 
to deal with the issues. As I turn to the third element o f  a new 
world order I have to start with a confession which you will find 
disappointing, perhaps even shocking. It seems clear that the 
position of  transnational companies will have to be defined in 
a new order. At the same time, we are not only lacking the
11 D. N degw a and R. Triffin: op. cit., p .209.
12 Brookings Institution; Reshaping the International Economic Order
(W ashington 1972); p .4.
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institutions which might do so — the U N  Group of  Eminent 
Men is an admission of  impotence rather than an assertion of 
competence — but we do not even know what could usefully be 
done. In this respect, I can do no more therefore than expose 
the problem, discuss one or two proposals for solving it, and 
leave the big question wide open. Let me say right away, how­
ever, that this fact in itself implies an enormous threat for 
prosperity and independence: either transnational companies 
are allowed to operate unchecked, in which case they will 
threaten the freedom and livelihood of many; or they will be 
destroyed and reduced to national political spaces, in which 
case the freedom and livelihood of many will be threatened by 
their absence.
I have indicated the dilemma before. Transnational com­
panies are the most vital force of production of modern 
economies; but they have outgrown our relations of production. 
Their potential for growth is considerable even in an unfavour­
able climate. Yet it is strange to live in a world in which the 100 
biggest companies control more wealth than the 100 smallest 
countries, and in which the 500 largest companies will soon 
account for one-half o f  world production and one-quarter of 
world trade .13 How can the world keep the benefits of these 
nine-headed hydras while checking the obvious and by now 
well-documented opportunities for abuse?
Most proposals for change suffer from either leaving trans­
national companies ultimately to their own resources, or de­
claring war on them, or taking refuge in proposals for yet 
another international agency. The Report to the Club of Rome 
by Jan Tinbergen and others has all these weaknesses. It is 
useful to suggest that transnationals should be induced to give 
more information and told to comply with national develop­
ment plans, but this will not make much difference. It is odd to 
develop a design for the creation of counter-vailing powers to 
the hands of Third World governments, not only because the 
proposal that they should harmonize their tax systems is quite 
unrealistic, but also because engaging transnationals in battle 
cannot benefit anybody. There is no obvious reason why 
“ public international enterprises” should be preferable to large 
transnationals which have many public features in any case.
Figures based on I. Jazairy, P. Kuin and J. Som avia: “Transnational
Enterprises” , in J. Tinbergen: op. cit., p .274.
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And setting up an “ International Authority of  Transnational 
Enterprises” is surely begging the question o f  what should be 
done .14
Tinbergen’s Report also mentions a Code o f  Conduct, “with 
legally enforceable elements” , which “ should address such 
questions as ownership and control, financial flows, local value 
added and balance o f  payments, research and development, 
commercialization o f  technology, employment and labour, 
consumer protection, competition and market structure, transfer 
pricing taxation, accounting standards and disclosure, and re­
fraining from intervening in a host country’s political affairs” . 15 
But how should the Code address these questions? The answer 
is as urgent as it is hard to come by. Unless the institutions 
and individuals which have spent so much time and energy 
on the reconstruction of the world monetary system put their 
minds to it, we may well find ourselves joined in a perilous 
battle in which all stand to lose whatever happens.
The fourth element o f  a new world order which I want to 
discuss here concerns resources. They are, as can easily be seen, 
the most important economic link between the Four Worlds, 
uneven and inequitable as their relative positions may be. 
Everyone is, from one point of view, a seller or buyer of re­
sources, or both, and therefore interested in advantageous 
prices. Looking round the world, and more particularly the 
history o f  commodity agreements, it would appear that the 
balance of  advantage can be found in stable prices. Everyone 
is, from another point of view, a producer or consumer of re­
sources, or both. Consumers at least are interested in security 
of supply; producers may be interested in continuity o f  market 
chances. There is possibly a balance of advantages with respect 
to access as well. These two equations add up to what is likely 
to be a principle o f  the New International Economic Order for 
which so many have been groping since the objective was first 
announced by the U N  in 1974.
One way of  defining the principle is to follow the argument 
advanced by Ian Brownlie in terms of international law.1*'
14 Cf. J. Tinbergen: op. cit., ch. 15.
15 J. Tinbergen: op. cit., p. 160.
16 Q uotations in this paragraph are from I. Brownlie’s inaugural lecture at the
London School o f  Econom ics (1978): Loaves and Fishes. Access to Natural
Resources and International Law.
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Brownlie argues that for the “equitable allocation of resources” 
on an international scale, national law and practice offers no 
useful analogies, and international law has few applicable 
precedents. The “ individualist principle” characteristic even 
of the Antarctica regime and ideas for an International Sea-bed 
Area offers little that is useful. Brownlie then refers, as a new 
departure, to the pricing system suggested by Jose Figueres, 
according to which a “ development price” for every commodity 
might be regarded as a minimum wage for (underdeveloped) 
producers and a development tax for (developed) consumers 
at the same time.17 This of course does not by itself involve 
any guarantee of access to natural resources. If one works on 
the assumption that inroads on national sovereignty have to 
be ruled out, such guarantees can be given by the creation of 
“ resource pools” for critical resources, to which producers 
have to contribute on the basis of an assessment and from 
which consumers would receive quotas determined by certain 
principles. “ Resource pools would prove at least as successful 
in prices stabilization as the existing commodity agreements. 
Moreover, the establishment of a relatively objective price 
would justify the obligations placed upon producers. Users 
would find a more tractable supply situation since at present 
producers may reduce exports in order to force price levels 
upward.” 18 Brownlie realizes that the chances are slight 
that his proposals are adopted in the near future. I have 
mentioned them here because they demonstrate that solutions 
of the double problem o f  resource prices and access to resources 
are possible without a giant international agency, and without 
impositions on national sovereignty. Such solutions have a 
political cost. They require the admission of restrictions on 
the principles of  free or market economies; these might be 
acceptable to most. They also require deliberate restrictions of 
economic growth in developed countries; these will not be 
acceptable for the time being. But perhaps such changes — 
sacrifices, if that is the word — point more clearly to what is 
required in order to regulate North-South conflict than the 
Poor Law principles which have so far been applied.
The reference is to the working paper on “ Som e Econom ic Foundations
o f  Human Rights” , presented by J. Figueres to the U N  Conference on
Human Rights in 1968.
1" J. Tinbergen: op. cit., p.71.
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If and when the negotiations between poor and rich nations 
about a “ new deal” for the underprivileged seriously start, 
their subjects will be so numerous that they will am ount almost 
to world order talks. One must hope that the Brandt Commis­
sion which has started its work in 1977 and promises relevant 
findings, will help us prepare their agenda. One of the dangers 
in the situation is that these negotiations will be about the way 
in which the new order is dealt rather than the deal itself; the 
fact that already participation and the structure of institutions 
have become a contentious issue between N orth  and South 
points to an understandable and yet regrettable departure from 
issues of substance. It is all the more important that these 
issues of substance are clearly identified and, what is more, 
that priorities are seen for what they are. It is true that the 
trade and monetary systems need to take account of  the re­
quirements of  both the Third and the Fourth  W orlds ; it is true 
that world-wide industrialization has consequences for financial 
as well as other economic institutions. But once it is accepted 
that the prime objective of the international new deal must be 
citizenship for all — or, more modestly, policies which provide 
conditions for such citizenship — then the primacy of one 
particular issue emerges with equal clarity. The Tinbergen 
Report has stated this with justified emphasis: “ Development 
is not a linear process, and the aim of development is not to 
‘catch up ’ economically, socially, politically, or culturally ... 
N or can mass poverty necessarily be attacked through high 
growth rates, the advantages of which will eventually ‘trickle 
dow n’ to the masses.” 19 What matters is that the satisfaction 
o f  basic human needs is attacked directly and as an issue of 
world citizenship.
The concept o f  basic or minimum hum an needs may be 
somewhat nebulous, but it is clear enough that this involves 
food, clothes and shelter as well as elementary health care 
and literacy for all, and employment for as many as possible. 
Studies o f  the World Bank have estimated that the realization 
of this objective would require the sum of $125 billion (in 1974 
prices) over a period o f  10 years —  a large sum, and yet a small 
one if measured against arms expenditure, or even the G N P
19 Cf. J. Grant and M. ul Haq: “ Income Redistribution and th e  In tern at ion a l
Financing o f D evelopm ent” , in J. Tinbergen: op. cit., p .217.
of the rich nations.20 James Grant and M ahbud ul Haq 
have considered the substantive and institutional implications 
of such a programme. It would be necessary to change the 
nature and increase the quantity of the present transfer of 
resources by way of “ a id” . “ An element of automation must 
be built into the resource transfer system” which, for the time 
being, is likely to stop short of “ international taxation” , but 
may make use of expended IM F potential and quasi-taxes 
on resources, pollutants, even transnationals. Spending must 
concentrate on the poorest countries and be geared to “ inter­
national assistance to national programmes aimed at satisfying 
basic human needs” .21 Such a programme can, to a consider­
able extent, be channeled through the World Bank system, 
though this would have to be adapted for the purpose. “ More 
automation in World Bank/IDA financial resources is needed, 
in any case, to free it increasingly from bilateral pressures and 
to enable it to play a truly multilateral role in the new economic 
order.” 22 This requires universality of membership, a restruc­
turing of voting rights, and an extension of the range of services 
offered. However, in this way, the satisfaction of basic human 
needs becomes a manageable problem, and thus a genuine first 
step towards citizenship rights for all men.
The notion of citizenship connotes among other things 
certain basic rights which have come to be called human rights. 
The authors o f  the Report to the Trilateral Commission would 
like to include them in their concept of “ basic human needs"23, 
and if one thinks of the Indian elections of 1977 one might well 
conclude that they are right. However, I suggest that we keep 
our terminology clear and distinguish not only between basic 
needs of physical survival and human rights, but also between 
human rights in the strictest sense and the liberal and democratic 
institutions characteristic of the West. Hum an rights in this 
essential sense accrue from the inviolability o f  the person. They 
rule out police brutality, arbitrary arrest, imprisonment without 
trial, torture, and related attacks on the integrity and dignity of 
men. Hum an rights in this sense include the elementary needs
J. Grant and M. ul Haq: op. cit., p.216sq.
:i J. Grant and M. ul Haq: op. cit., p .220.
R. N . Cooper, K. Kaiser and M. K osaka: op. cit., p .29.
R. N. Cooper, K. Kaiser and M. K osaka: op. cit., p .30.
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of expression, the right to express a cultural heritage, a religious 
affiliation, a moral conviction, a political view. There are more 
sophisticated human rights, such as the right to geographic 
mobility, or the right to form associations, suffrage and the 
right to strike. These are all a part of any advanced notion of 
human rights. But for purposes of this discussion— and of 
the identification o f  the sixth basic element o f  a new world 
order — I want to concentrate on the two essentials: the right 
of inviolability (habeas corpus), and the right of expression. 
The Report to the Trilateral Commission says: “ In many 
cases, the support for human rights will have to be balanced 
against other important goals for world order.” 24 I disagree. 
Support for a democratic form of government, or for a market 
economy, may have to be balanced against other goals; even 
the right to form associations and engage in industrial or 
political struggle, though very close to the basic right of ex­
pression, may from time to time have to be balanced in this 
way — but there is no balance in the name of which elementary 
human rights can be set aside for one moment. The right to 
habeas corpus and the right of expression are absolute; no 
regime however much it may be under pressure, no society 
however poor it may be, has the right to restrict them. I am 
aware of course that the word “absolute” requires reasoning, 
and that I am talking about a moral prescription. But then 
there it is: man cannot have come to his planet to be tortured 
and held in captivity by man, to be prevented from being him­
self by others. There is an elementary dignity o f  hum an life 
for which there are no national or cultural boundaries, no 
economic or social disabilities, no political excuses.
The United Nations have been singularly unsuccessful in 
defending elementary human rights; for them, the integrity of 
nations has at all times been more important than the integrity 
o f  men. This is perhaps the greatest failure of the world or­
ganization, albeit a predictable one. The European Convention 
of Hum an Rights has been more successful in its region, and 
may well serve as a model for others. It shows that there has to 
be a judicial institution to watch transgressions. But in the last 
analysis, insistence on human rights is an objective o f  inter­
national relations throughout. Everyone has the duty to speak
24 J. Tinbergen: op. cit., p.43.
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up against violations; in this respect silence is as irresponsible 
as covering up and secrecy.
These then are six strategic elements of a new world order: 
strengthened arrangements against proliferation of dangerous 
nuclear technology and materials; the restoration of confidence 
in the monetary system; machinery for controlling transnational 
companies without destroying their benefits; guarantees of 
access to natural resources, coupled with a pricing system to 
help producers; arrangements to satisfy elementary human 
needs in the poor countries by way of a development tax; rules 
and institutions to safeguard human rights everywhere. We 
have begun this lecture by stipulating three main objectives of 
a world order: peace, prosperity, and citizenship rights for all. 
Would these objectives be achieved if the strategic elements 
were present?
It would not. It is important to see that we have discussed 
steps in the right direction, but not the attainment o f  the desti­
nation. There is in fact no such thing as a patent solution for 
the ills o f  the world. International rules, arrangements and 
organizations can impose constraints on the actions of  countries, 
companies and individuals; they can assist and at times stimulate 
developments; but they cannot offer guarantees of success. The 
world would remain very imperfect even if some or all of  the 
elements we have discussed were implemented. Accepting this 
limitation, how are they likely to be implemented? There are 
two extreme approaches to this question. One is that of 
Tinbergen and his collaborators in the Report to the Club of 
Rome. They begin by focussing on “ the U N  system: it may 
be weak and imperfect yet it remains the only machinery with 
the potential for constructing a fairer world” .25 However, it 
can do so only if an even grander design is added to it “ through 
the negotiation and adoption by both the rich and poor nations 
of a. framework treaty which clearly lays down the ground-rules 
for international cooperation and the guiding principles to be 
adopted by nation states in building the new order. It would 
comprise an umbrella treaty based upon cooperation rather 
than competition, and would clearly demonstrate that all can 
benefit from organized change.” 26 They compare the new
J. Tinbergen: op. cit., p. 116.
J. Tinbergen: op. cit., p. 117.
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treaty with the Treaty of  Rome on which the European Com m u­
nity is based and leave no doubt in the supranational character 
o f  their intentions: “ All states shall accept the evolution o f  a 
world organization with the necessary powers to plan, to make 
decisions and to enforce them.,,27
At the other end o f  the scale of proposals for a “ global 
strategy” we find the highly pragmatic principles advocated by 
the Report to the Trilateral Commission which, contrary to the 
Club o f  Rome, includes many active decision-makers. “There 
are several important guidelines for making problems more 
manageable, for facilitating cooperation amidst diversity in the 
management of interdependence,” they say modestly and 
mention four such principles: “ piecemeal functionalism”
(separation o f  issues in order to find durable solutions), “ rule- 
making with decentralization” (only the rules international, 
their management decentralized), “ flexible participation” 
(variable membership depending on the nature of the problem), 
“ evolutionary change” ( “ it would not make sense in today’s 
world to freeze any institutional arrangement into a particular 
pattern or membership” ).
Neither the systematic nor the pragmatic extreme are fully 
convincing, although if a choice had to be made I would opt for 
the pragmatic. The notion that a new world order should be 
created in one fell swoop is not only unrealistic; it is also based 
on a naive belief in benevolent government which many have 
learnt to distrust who have come to see not only totalitarian 
excesses but also the weaknesses of organized capitalism and 
the welfare state. There is no reason whatsoever to believe that 
a world government would do better than the governments of 
states, and there are many reasons to believe that it would 
do worse. Its accountability would be a more than technical 
problem. It would be more likely to fall into the hands of 
self-interested technocrats than into those of concerned repre­
sentatives. It would be almost bound to overlook the strength 
that is in diversity and the humanity that is in difference.
On the other hand, piecemeal functionalism could become 
too piecemeal, and even too functional. Change in international 
relations is in part at least a response to changing patterns of 
power. These changes are happening rapidly at this time. With
2 R. N. Cooper, K. Kaiser and M. K osaka: op. cit., p.VIII.
the shift from an old to a new conflict the role of both super­
powers is reduced, and notably that of the Soviet Union; with 
increasing obstacles to economic growth, those find their place 
enhanced whose starting position happens to be relatively 
favourable; the issue o f  resources creates new relations of 
interdependence. Unless a number of major decisions are taken 
soon, we are heading for growing disparities first, almost an 
international version of apartheid, and vicious confrontation 
later.
Will these decisions be taken? I have dealt with the United 
Nations system in these lectures with a degree of mildness. It 
is too easy to charge the U N  with failure simply because many 
big problems are still with us. In fact, U N  institutions and 
conferences have taken up every single issue which we have 
discussed in this lecture. New agencies have been created to 
deal with particular matters, from U N C T A D  to U N ID O  and 
from the G roup of Eminent Persons to Special Assemblies. All 
this is not to be underrated. But it underlines the fact that the 
United Nations Organization is essentially the great talk-shop 
of the world. Here, issues are presented, views are aired, and 
conflicts are expressed — but decisions are taken elsewhere. I 
have mentioned three institutions specifically: the IAEA, the 
IM F and the World Bank; commodity agreements and legal or 
para-legal institutions have been alluded to. In so far as inter­
national action is required, I would expect progress in the years 
to come from such specialized institutions, especially if they 
are not universal, and from arrangements which involve self- 
balancing economic and political mechanisms, rather than from 
a deliberate effort o f  institution-building or a conversion of 
the United Nations.
But will even this modest programme be realized? I do not 
know. I would not have given these lectures, were it not for 
the underlying hope that reason and long-term interest will in 
the end prevail over emotion and short-term thinking. The 
world could be a better place if we chose to make it so. But I 
cannot conclude on a note of unmitigated optimism. The 
possibility that instead o f  a new world order we will have world 
chaos, world civil war and even world self-destruction is by no 
means small. The nuclear holocaust is, in the views o f  some, 
quite likely. An international class struggle seems to me much
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more probable than the timely creation o f  institutions for its 
regulation. And given the effects of  the social changes which 
have occurred in the developed world, it is far more likely that 
narrow self-interest will lead us into a world in which everyone 
beggars his neighbour than that we will find common ground 
on which to deal with our differences. M ankind usually solves 
its problems when it is a little too late to solve them sensibly, 
at five minutes past twelve so to speak. Why should this be 
any different with respect to the problems of  international 
relations in the 1980s?
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